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Abstract 
This	thesis	is	concerned	with	how	development	organizations	work	globally	and	how	their	work	constitutes	part	of	global	governance	practices.	South	Sudan	is	studied	as	case	of	a	development	task.	By	employing	an	analytical	framework	that	combines	a	governmentality	approach	with	ethnography	of	development,	the	analysis	is	able	to	establish	how	South	Sudan	was	problematized	as	a	case	of	‘underdevelopment’.	The	thesis	finds	that	the	practices	of	development	organizations,	which	include	using	a	calculative	rationality	to	gather	political	support,	pursuing	a	goal	of	institutional	survival	and	being	limited	in	their	space	for	action,	result	in	their	development	work	in	South	Sudan	being	out	of	touch	with	the	local	‘reality’	and	thus	restrained	in	its	ability	to	create	developmental	change.	Further,	it	appears	that	these	characteristics	may	be	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices,	which	has	not	been	significantly	influenced	by	the	fragile	states	agenda.	
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1. Introduction 
This	thesis	is	concerned	with	how	development	organizations	work	globally	and	it	will	explore	the	development	work	done	in	South	Sudan,	where	the	international	society	was	engaged	in	getting	the	new,	and	arguably	fragile,	state	up	and	running.	On	9	July	2011,	the	international	society	congratulated	South	Sudan	on	their	independence.	The	rhetoric	was	profound	when	international	state	leaders	spoke	at	the	independence	ceremony	in	Juba,	the	new	capital.	One,	if	not	the	most	prominent	guest,	U.S.	President	Barack	Obama	stated	“Today	is	a	reminder	that,	after	the	darkness	of	war,	the	light	of	a	new	dawn	is	possible”	(Rice	2011).	Arguably,	it	was	a	historic	moment,	as	South	Sudan	was	the	first	state	in	Africa	to	gain	independence	through	a	popular	referendum	(Sarwar	2011:	224–228).	It	was	the	signing	of	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	(CPA)	in	2005	by	the	government	of	Sudan	and	the	Sudan	People’s	Liberation	Army	(SPLA)	that	had	paved	the	way	for	the	referendum,	in	which	an	overwhelming	majority	of	the	southern	population	voted	for	independence	(Sarwar	2011:	226–228).	The	parties	had	signed	the	CPA,	which	brought	an	end	to	Sudan’s	second	civil	war,	after	a	long	negotiation	process	and	sustained	mediation	efforts	from	the	international	society.	Especially	the	so-called	troika,	which	consists	of	the	U.S.,	the	UK	and	Norway,	had	been	engaged	in	the	negotiation	process	led	by	the	Intergovernmental	Authority	on	Development	(IGAD).	They	hoped	that	the	peace	agreement	would	bring	peace	to	Sudan	and	increase	stability	in	the	whole	region	(Astill-Brown	2014).	
Even	though	the	peace	between	the	Khartoum	government	and	the	SPLA	had	been	kept	throughout	the	CPA’s	interim	period,	there	was	no	shortage	of	challenges	facing	the	new	South	Sudanese	state	in	2011.	The	southern	part	of	Sudan	suffered	from	low	levels	of	socioeconomic	development	and	a	lack	of	administrative	capacity	due	to	the	prolonged	civil	war,	during	which	the	central	government	in	Khartoum	had	been	largely	absent	from	the	south	(Belloni	2011:	424).	As	the	Norwegian	Prime	Minister	Kjell	Magne	Bondevik	had	recognized	already	in	2005:	“Sudan	is	now	moving	from	making	peace	to	building	peace	through	political,	economic	and	social	development	and	security	reforms.	The	support	of	the	international	community	will	be	needed	in	all	these	fields”	(Bondevik	2005).	Accordingly,	there	was	a	widely	held	view	that	the	international	society	would	have	to	engage	in	large-scale	development	work	to	support	South	Sudan	in	its	first	years	as	an	independent	state,	if	the	dismal	prophecy	of	South	Sudan	as	a	‘pre-failed’	state	were	not	to	come	true	(Downie	2011:	18;	Nasir	2009).	
The	denomination	of	South	Sudan	as	a	‘pre-failed’	state	reflects	the	fact	that	the	terms	‘failed	state’	and	‘fragile	state’	have	emerged	as	buzzwords	within	the	development	community	(Osaghae	2010).	Initially,	the	fragile	states	agenda	emerged	during	the	1990’s,	when	states	that	lacked	features	
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considered	to	be	characteristics	of	empirical	statehood,	such	as	institutional	authority	and	the	ability	to	provide	socioeconomic	welfare,	came	to	be	seen	as	a	new	global	security	and	development	challenge	(Jackson	1990:	21).	This	was	due	to	the	strong	link	between	weak	statehood	and	the	outbreak	of	violent	conflict,	and	the	fact	that	globalization	meant	that	the	consequences	of	conflicts	in	developing	countries	could	be	felt	in	western	states	as	well,	for	example	through	migration	flows	or	terrorist	attacks	(Robinson	2007).	
Since	then,	the	notion	of	state	fragility	has	slowly	gained	traction	within	the	development	community.	In	2005,	OECD’s	Development	Assistance	Committee	(OECD-DAC)	set	up	a	working	group	on	fragile	states	and	both	the	British	and	the	American	donor	agencies,	DFID	and	USAID,	published	policy	papers	on	how	they	would	engage	in	fragile	states	(DFID	2005;	OECD	2007;	USAID	2005).	Furthermore,	the	UK	has	announced	in	2015	that	it	will	“allocate	50%	of	all	DFID’s	spending	to	fragile	states	and	regions”	(HM	Treasury	and	DFID	2015:	4).	This	focus	on	fragile	states	is	also	supported	by	the	fact	that	a	growing	number	of	the	world’s	poor	people	live	in	fragile	states,	and	the	fact	that	this	trend	is	expected	to	continue.	Chandy	et	al.	(2013:	14)	estimate	that	nearly	two-thirds	of	the	world’s	poor	will	live	in	fragile	states	by	2030.	As	such,	when	South	Sudan	is	categorized	as	a	fragile	state,	it	also	becomes	an	object	for	development	work.	
While	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	become	more	and	more	widespread,	some	western	countries	have	been	cutting	down	on	their	spending	on	development	aid	and	refocusing	aid	so	that	it	is	increasingly	directed	to	purposes	that	serve	the	national	interests	of	the	donor	country	(Morris	2013).	This	tendency	is	reflected	for	instance	in	a	UK	policy	paper	published	in	2015,	which	establishes	a	strong	link	between	development	aid	and	the	pursuit	of	national	interests	(HM	Treasury	and	DFID	2015).	Also	the	Netherlands,	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	Canada	among	others	have	followed	this	trend,	cutting	down	on	aid	budgets	and	seeking	to	combine	aid	allocations	with	foreign	policy	objectives	(Day	2013).	Consequently,	it	appears	that	development	organizations	are	under	increased	pressure	to	deliver	results	and	conduct	successful	development	projects	as	they	are	competing	for	a	shrinking	pool	of	funds.	
The	development	organizations’	response	to	fragile	states	is	to	engage	in	statebuilding	activities,	that	is,	projects	which	seek	to	expand	“the	autonomy,	authority,	legitimacy	and	capacity	of	the	state”	(Chandler	and	Sisk	2013:	xxii).	In	reality,	development	organizations	have	largely	focused	their	efforts	on	capacity	building	within	ministries	and	other	governmental	agencies,	as	this	aspect	is	the	most	tangible	and	approachable.	As	USAID	puts	it,	“Outsiders	are	far	better	equipped	to	address	effectiveness	deficits	than	to	promote	legitimacy”	(USAID	2005:	5).	Capacity	building	projects	have	far	from	always	brought	about	significant	change,	and	a	critique	of	the	way	development	organizations	
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plan	and	implement	capacity	building	projects	has	emerged.	Pritchett	et	al.	have	argued	that	the	current	way	development	organizations	work	leads	to	failure	in	increasing	the	recipient	state’s	capabilities.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	development	organizations	often	adopt	a	generic	‘theory	of	change’	which	assumes	that	developing	countries	will	develop	along	a	common	trajectory	composed	of	economic,	political,	social	and	administrative	modernization	(Pritchett	et	al.	2010:	4–5).	Such	an	understanding	of	development	inevitably	leads	to	a	propensity	towards	adopting	‘best	practice’	solutions	that	are	not	adapted	to	the	local	context	(Pritchett	et	al.	2010:	43).	
Yet	such	criticisms	are	not	new.	Already	in	1988,	Therkildsen	argued	that	development	organizations’	control-oriented	approach	to	planning	and	implementation	were	impeding	the	effectiveness	of	development	projects,	and	he	called	for	a	more	adaptive	approach	to	development	(Therkildsen	1988).	Arguably,	this	is	because	the	control-oriented	approach	is	based	on	a	variety	of	false	assumptions	concerning	the	consensus	on	project	objectives	among	donors	and	recipients;	the	existence	of	recipient	agencies	with	the	skills,	authority	and	will	to	implement	projects;	and	the	predictability	and	level	of	knowledge	of	the	local	context	among	others	(Therkildsen	1988:	162–180).	Further,	Therkildsen	drew	on	even	earlier	studies	that	support	his	findings	(Korten	1980;	Rondinelli	1983).	So	why	is	it	that	“donor	illusions	about	the	advantages	of	having	a	good	plan	are	alive	and	well”,	as	Booth	puts	it	(2015:	14)?	Do	the	planning	and	implementation	practices	of	development	organizations	still	impede	the	international	society’s	ability	to	promote	development?	And	what	does	this	mean	for	their	ability	to	tackle	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states?	
Based	on	these	questions,	this	thesis	will	investigate	the	practices	of	development	organizations	in	relation	to	South	Sudan,	which	is	an	example	of	a	fragile	state	where	the	international	society	has	been	heavily	engaged	in	development	work.	This	investigation	will	open	up	for	a	discussion	of	the	global	consequences	of	the	current	practices	of	development	organizations.	
Research question and sub-questions In	line	with	the	considerations	above,	the	present	thesis	will	seek	to	answer	the	following	research	question:	
How	is	South	Sudan	problematized	as	a	development	task	by	key	members	of	the	international	
society	and	how	have	international	development	organizations	approached	this	development	
task?	
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The	investigation	is	divided	into	three	parts,	which	will	each	answer	one	of	the	following	sub-questions:	
• How	has	the	troika	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task?	(Chapter	4)	
• What	characterizes	the	practices	of	international	development	organizations	in	their	development	work,	focusing	on	statebuilding,	in	South	Sudan?	(Chapter	5)	
• How	do	the	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	fit	into	the	global	development	regime	of	practices	and	which	consequences	does	this	regime	of	practices	have	for	development	work	globally?	(Chapter	6)	
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2. Methodological reflections 
The	present	thesis	investigates	the	way	development	is	done	in	practice,	or	in	other	words	how	development	organizations	work.	This	chapter	will	elaborate	on	how	this	investigation	is	conducted,	describing	how	the	research	question	will	be	approached	and	answered	and	presenting	some	of	the	methodological	reflections	that	have	guided	the	research	design.	First,	I	will	clarify	the	main	concepts	used	in	the	thesis.	Then	I	will	explain	how	South	Sudan	can	be	understood	as	a	case	of	a	development	task	and	further	what	is	included	and	excluded	in	the	scope	of	the	investigation.	In	the	fourth	section,	I	will	explain	how	the	analysis	will	evolve	in	the	following	chapters	and	the	last	two	sections	concern	my	use	of	empirical	data,	focusing	on	interviews.	
Clarification of concepts In	order	to	specify	how	the	research	question	should	be	understood	and	what	the	analysis	will	encompass,	this	section	will	provide	a	clarification	of	the	main	concepts	used	in	the	research	question	and	the	sub-questions.	
To	‘problematize’	should	be	understood	as	engaging	in	a	“set	of	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	that	makes	something	enter	into	the	play	of	the	true	and	the	false	and	constitutes	an	object	for	thought”	(Foucault	1988:	257).	In	other	words,	it	is	the	process	that,	through	policy	formulation,	creates	something	as	a	problem,	and	thereby	as	something	that	has	to	be	solved.	In	relation	hereto,	I	view	a	‘development	task’	as	a	specific	type	of	problematization,	namely	one	that	calls	for	development	organizations	to	do	development	work	in	order	to	overcome	the	problem.	The	problematization	of	a	development	task	can	be	done	both	with	reference	to	the	suffering	of	the	people	in	the	country	in	question	and/or	with	reference	to	the	threat	that	it	poses	to	the	international	society.	
The	term	‘international	society’	is	used	to	mean	the	society	of	states	and	other	international	actors,	which	interact	on	the	international	stage	according	to	a	set	of	common	rules	(Bull	and	Watson	1984:	1).	Importantly,	the	international	society	is	not	to	be	understood	as	an	actor	in	itself	but	rather	as	comprising	all	the	states	that	South	Sudan	is	interacting	with	in	its	international	relations.	The	‘key	members’	that	are	referred	to	in	the	research	question	are	the	U.S.,	the	UK	and	Norway.	Due	to	their	historical	engagement	in	South	Sudan,	these	three	countries	have	come	to	be	known	under	the	common	term	the	‘troika’,	which	I	also	use	as	a	collective	term	for	the	three	states.	However,	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	troika	can	be	viewed	as	one	actor.	
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The	second	sub-question	speaks	of	‘statebuilding’,	and	by	this	term	I	understand	any	efforts	by	development	organizations	that	aim	at	“expanding	over	time	the	autonomy,	authority,	legitimacy	and	capacity	of	the	state”	(Chandler	and	Sisk	2013:	xxii).	Thus,	I	apply	a	distinction	between	state	formation,	which	“describes	the	formation	of	the	state	through	indigenous	or	internal	violence	between	competing	groups	and	their	agendas”,	and	statebuilding,	which	is	led	by	“external	actors,	organisations,	donors,	IFIs,	agencies	and	INGOs”	(Richmond	2013:	382).	Relatedly,	I	use	the	term	‘international	development	organization’	to	denote	any	organization	involved	in	development	work	on	an	international	scale,	for	example	donor	agencies,	NGOs,	international	organizations	such	as	the	UN	and	the	World	Bank	and	private	companies,	who	act	as	service	providers	on	development	projects.	Due	to	their	cross-border	activities	and	interactions,	international	development	organizations	are	viewed	as	actors	in	the	international	society.	
I	also	use	the	term	‘regime	of	practices’.	This	concept	is	derived	from	the	Foucauldian	governmentality	approach,	and	it	is	defined	as	a	fairly	organized	and	coherent	way	of	doing	things	(Dean	2010).	Thus,	the	‘development	regime	of	practices’	refers	to	a	specific	regime	of	practices,	namely	the	fairly	organized	and	coherent	way	that	development	organizations	do	development	work.	
South Sudan as a case of a development task In	order	to	shed	light	on	how	development	organizations	work	through	the	examination	of	concrete	and	specific	practices,	South	Sudan	is	chosen	as	a	case	of	a	development	task.	South	Sudan	is	chosen	because	it	is	one	of	the	most	recent	examples	of	a	state,	where	the	international	development	community	became	engaged	on	a	massive	scale	at	a	(more	or	less)	specific	point	in	time	(following	the	CPA	in	2005)	and	with	an	articulated	common	aim	of	getting	the	new	country	up	and	running.	As	South	Sudan	only	became	an	independent	state	in	2011	and	it	had	been	marred	by	40	years	of	civil	war,	the	international	society	saw	it	both	as	a	big	and	very	important	development	task	(Downie	2011:	17–18).	
The	case	serves	as	an	illustration	of	how	the	international	society	establishes	something	as	a	development	task	and	further	how	international	development	organizations	approach	this	task	and	attempt	to	address	it	through	development	work.	Furthermore,	South	Sudan	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	fragile	state,	as	will	be	argued	in	Chapter	4,	and	as	such	the	case	can	also	illustrate	how	the	fragile	states	agenda	may	influence	the	construction	of	and	solutions	applied	to	a	development	task.	As	was	described	above,	development	tasks	are	socially	constructed	through	problematizations	that	establish	a	task	as	one	suitable	for	development	work.	Thus,	South	Sudan	could	be	viewed	as	a	case	of	a	variety	of	things,	for	example	as	a	case	of	a	country	in	civil	war	or	a	case	of	an	oil-producing	country.	In	line	
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with	Christian	Lund’s	(2014:	230)	methodological	reflections,	the	case	is	produced	by	my	investigation	of	it,	through	the	analytical	and	theoretical	lens	that	I	apply.	By	choosing	to	investigate	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task,	I	attempt	to	deconstruct	this	way	of	problematizing	South	Sudan,	but	at	the	same	time	I	am	also	part	of	constructing	the	case,	in	line	with	Hacking’s	notion	of	the	object	of	study	as	a	‘moving	target’	which	is	changed	by	our	investigation	of	it	(Hacking	2006:	2).	For	example,	through	analysis	of	my	empirical	data	I	identify	some	characteristics	of	the	local	‘reality’	in	South	Sudan.	However	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	‘reality’	is	also	constructed	through	my	interviewees’	experience	of	South	Sudan	and	my	interactions	with	them.	As	such,	the	mentioning	of	a	local	‘reality’	should	not	be	taken	to	mean	that	this	construction	is	more	‘real’	than	the	development	organizations’	construction	of	South	Sudan,	only	that	it	might	be	closer	to	the	way	South	Sudanese	people	generally	experience	their	‘reality’.	
Scope of the investigation This	section	will	explicate	what	the	investigation	will	focus	on	and	what	is	delimited	from	the	scope	of	the	analysis.	I	have	chosen	to	put	particular	focus	on	the	statebuilding	dimension	of	development	work,	because	of	the	predominant	role	that	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	gained	in	the	development	community.	Therefore,	it	will	be	relevant	to	look	at	whether	the	rhetoric	focus	on	statebuilding	is	followed	by	an	equal	focus	in	practice	and	how	statebuilding	work	is	different	from	other	types	of	development	work.	Three	specific	development	projects,	which	all	have	a	statebuilding	dimension,	have	been	chosen	as	examples	of	the	development	work	done	in	South	Sudan	and	they	are	presented	in	Chapter	5.	The	combination	of	these	three	projects	can	shed	light	on	how	different	kinds	of	development	organizations	work.	The	projects	were	also	chosen	because	of	the	availability	of	information	about	them	and	the	access	to	interviewees	who	had	experience	with	or	knowledge	about	the	projects.	
In	investigating	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	I	also	put	special	focus	on	three	donor	countries:	the	U.S.,	the	UK	and	Norway	(the	troika).	I	have	chosen	to	focus	on	these	three	states,	because	they	are	key	actors	in	relation	to	South	Sudan.	This	is	due	to	their	historical	engagement	with	Sudan,	which	will	be	elaborated	on	in	Chapter	5.	Thus,	it	makes	sense	to	focus	on	these	three	states	in	the	first	part	of	the	analysis.	However,	in	the	second	part	of	the	analysis,	where	the	analysis	investigates	concrete	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	the	focus	on	these	three	donors	becomes	more	blurred	as	development	projects	are	often	funded	by	a	variety	of	donor	countries	and	implemented	by	development	organizations	from	different	countries	as	well.	As	a	consequence,	it	is	not	feasible	to	make	a	clear	distinction	between	the	troika	countries	and	other	donors.	
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The	investigation	is	also	limited	in	the	time	period	that	it	focuses	on.	The	state	of	South	Sudan	was	not	established	until	2011,	and	therefore	most	development	organizations	did	not	publish	official	policy	papers	regarding	their	work	in	South	Sudan	before	then.	Therefore,	the	first	part	of	the	analysis	is	focused	on	policy	papers	that	concern	organizations’	strategies	for	development	work	in	South	Sudan	after	2011.	On	the	other	hand	though,	South	Sudan	achieved	many	characteristics	of	statehood	already	following	the	signing	of	the	CPA	in	2005,	when	for	example	the	regional	government	of	South	Sudan	was	established.	At	this	point	in	time	there	was	a	large	influx	of	aid	to	South	Sudan,	and	many	of	the	development	projects	that	continued	after	independence	were	established	in	the	period	2005-2011.	So	the	second	part	of	the	analysis	focuses	on	the	whole	period	from	2005	to	2014.	The	civil	war	that	broke	out	in	South	Sudan	in	December	2013	has	meant	that	many	development	projects	have	been	discontinued.	As	such,	the	most	recent	events	will	not	be	covered	by	the	investigation,	both	because	the	object	of	study,	development	and	statebuilding	work,	was	largely	halted	and	because	information	about	this	time	period	is	very	sparse.	
The	methodological	choices	described	here	allow	the	investigation	to	have	a	clearly	defined	focus,	but	also	mean	that	the	conclusions	drawn	might	have	been	different	if	the	analysis	had	included	a	study	of	other	types	of	development	projects,	other	donor	countries	or	a	different	time	period.	Still,	an	investigation	can	never	cover	all	aspects	of	a	topic,	and	the	choices	have	been	made	in	a	way	that	was	meaningful	for	the	study	of	this	thesis’	overall	research	question.	
Analysis strategy The	analysis	is	divided	into	three	sections,	each	with	its	own	sub-question.	Chapter	4	will	provide	an	analysis	of	key	policy	papers	from	the	U.S.,	the	UK	and	Norway,	looking	at	how	South	Sudan	has	been	problematized	as	a	development	task.	Theoretically,	this	chapter	will	use	Bacchi’s	‘What’s	the	problem	represented	to	be?’	(WPR)	approach	in	combination	with	the	first	dimension	of	a	‘regime	of	practices’,	the	field	of	visibility,	from	a	governmentality	approach.	
In	Chapter	5,	I	will	analyze	the	development	and	statebuilding	work	that	has	actually	been	done	in	South	Sudan,	examining	which	features	characterize	the	practices	of	international	development	organizations.	This	part	of	the	analysis	will	draw	on	three	examples	of	statebuilding	projects	in	South	Sudan,	the	Safety	and	Access	to	Justice	Programme	in	South	Sudan	(SAJP),	the	UN’s	Disarmament,	Demobilisation	and	Reintegration	Program	(DDR)	and	Norway’s	Oil	for	Development	Program.	The	interviews	with	development	experts	and	practitioners	will	constitute	the	main	body	of	empirical	data	for	this	chapter,	and	the	theoretical	concepts	will	be	drawn	from	a	combined	governmentality/ethnography	of	development	framework.	
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Finally,	Chapter	6	will	feature	a	discussion	of	the	findings	from	the	previous	chapters	about	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	in	relation	to	global	practices	and	dynamics	of	development	work.	It	will	further	discuss	how	a	global	development	regime	of	practices	functions	and	which	consequences	it	has	for	development	work.	Below	is	a	schematic	representation	of	the	analysis	strategy:	
Research	question:	How	is	South	Sudan	problematized	as	a	development	task	by	key	members	of	the	international	society	and	how	have	international	development	organizations	approached	this	development	task?	Chapter	 4	 5	 6	Sub-question	 How	has	the	troika	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task?	
What	characterizes	the	practices	of	international	development	organizations	in	their	development	work,	focusing	on	statebuilding,	in	South	Sudan?			
How	do	the	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	fit	into	the	global	development	regime	of	practices	and	which	consequences	does	this	regime	of	practices	have	for	development	work	globally?	Empirical	data	 Policy	papers	Interviews	Academic	literature	
Interviews	Project	documents	Quantitative	data	on	aid	flows	Academic	literature	
Conclusions	from	the	previous	chapters	Interviews		Academic	literature	Theoretical	concepts	 Regime	of	practices:	field	of	visibility	Problematizations	
Regime	of	practices:	episteme,	techne,	identity	formation	Ethnographic	concepts	
Regime	of	practices	
Method		 Analysis	using	mainly	the	WPR	approach	 Analysis	using	the	combined	governmentality/ethnography	analytical	framework	
Discussion	
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Empirical data In	total,	four	types	of	empirical	data	are	used	in	this	project:	academic	literature,	documents,	interviews	and	quantitative	data	on	official	development	assistance	(ODA)	flows.	The	vast	majority	of	the	empirical	data	used	is	qualitative	data,	supplemented	with	some	quantitative	data	from	the	OECD	database	(OECD	2016).	
Documents	are	the	primary	type	of	empirical	data	used	in	the	first	part	of	the	analysis.	The	documents	used	are	policy	papers	and	project	documents	and	they	are	gathered	from	the	donor	agencies	USAID,	DFID,	Norad	and	related	organizations.	The	documents	are	seen	as	the	result	of	a	bargaining	process	between	different	interests	within	the	organization,	rather	than	as	a	literal	representation	of	the	practices	of	that	organization	(Mosse	2005a:	39).	Thus,	I	can	use	them	to	detect	which	concepts	and	ideas	are	dominant	within	the	organization	and	how	they	are	used	in	the	planning	process.	I	use	the	term	‘policy	paper’	to	cover	all	types	of	official	texts	published	by	an	organization	and	concerning	that	organization’s	intent	to	act	in	a	specific	way.	The	following	section	will	elaborate	on	the	methodological	reflections	regarding	the	main	type	of	empirical	data	used	in	the	second	part	of	the	analysis,	interviews.	
Interview method In	order	to	get	insights	into	the	practices	of	development	organizations	working	globally,	I	have	conducted	interviews	with	development	practitioners	and	experts.	Some	of	the	interviewees	spoke	about	general	tendencies	within	the	global	development	community,	whereas	others	had	direct	experience	working	with	development	projects	in	South	Sudan,	and	yet	others	contributed	with	a	combination	of	the	two.	
The	interviewees	were	chosen	through	personal	networks	and	the	initial	contact	to	researchers	in	the	field	started	a	process	of	snowballing,	which	led	to	contact	to	other	potential	interviewees.	Initially,	my	supervisor	acted	as	a	gatekeeper,	since	he	has	a	large	professional	network	of	people	in	the	chosen	‘population’	of	development	experts	and	professionals.	This	type	of	sampling	was	advantageous	for	two	reasons;	firstly	it	provided	access	to	a	hidden	‘population’	(Heckathorn	1997).	Many	development	organizations	do	not	have	publicly	available	list	of	their	employees	from	which	I	could	choose	my	interviewees.	Secondly,	the	personal	relationship	meant	that	people	with	busy	schedules	were	more	inclined	to	accept	an	interview,	as	it	could	be	considered	a	favor	to	a	colleague	and	thus	an	investment	in	their	professional	network.		Yet	the	type	of	sampling	also	entailed	that	the	interviewees	were	scattered	across	a	number	of	different	organizations,	which	meant	that	I	was	not	able	to	study	
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thoroughly	the	practices	of	one	specific	organization.	When	working	with	this	type	of	sampling,	the	goal	is	not	to	reach	a	sample	that	is	representative	in	a	traditional	sense,	but	to	reach	a	certain	‘level	of	saturation’	(Heckathorn	1997:	180).	I	was	not	able	to	reach	a	full	level	of	saturation,	where	no	new	information	would	come	from	conducting	more	interviews,	but	I	reached	a	level	where	the	same	points	and	issues	were	raised	by	several	interviewees,	providing	confirmation	that	the	information	was	not	specific	to	one	person’s	experience.	
The	interviewees	all	had	different	profiles	and	experiences,	and	thus	I	researched	their	background	and	field	of	expertise	thoroughly	and	personalized	the	interview	guide	to	fit	each	interviewee.	This	allowed	me	to	strengthen	my	‘knowledgeability’,	which	can	minimize	the	status	imbalance	between	the	researcher	and	the	interviewee	(Mikecz	2012:	489).		However,	this	challenge	remained,	as	the	interviewees	are	elites	in	their	field,	and	I	experienced	at	least	some	of	them	to	be	“control-seeking	respondents”	(Mikecz	2012:	484).	A	few	interviewees	asked	to	have	to	questions	sent	in	advance	and	some	of	them	had	a	clear	narrative	that	they	wanted	to	tell	during	the	interview.	Also,	some	interviewees	were	hesitant	to	talk	about	practices	that	could	reflect	badly	on	the	organization	that	they	worked	for.	This	means	that	some	topics	may	not	be	fully	represented	in	the	empirical	data,	however	by	listening	to	the	interviewees’	silences	as	well	as	their	statements,	I	was	able	to	discern	which	topics	they	found	controversial	and	thereby	which	topics	to	investigate	further.	
A	total	of	13	people	were	interviewed	and	two	of	the	interviews	have	been	used	solely	for	background	knowledge.	Most	of	the	interviews	were	conducted	in	person,	but	for	practical	reasons,	some	interviewees	located	abroad	were	interviewed	via	Skype	or	telephone.	The	interviews	were	conducted	in	Danish	or	English	and	quotes	from	interviews	conducted	in	Danish	have	been	translated	into	English	for	use	in	the	thesis.	All	interviewees	were	informed	about	the	purpose	of	the	interview	and	given	a	short	introduction	to	the	topics	of	the	thesis.	The	interviewees	were	given	the	option	to	be	anonymous	or	be	quoted	by	name.	A	list	with	a	description	of	each	interviewee	can	be	found	in	Annex	A.	Furthermore,	a	list	with	the	names	of	the	anonymous	interviewees	and	the	full	transcripts	of	the	interviews	are	available	to	the	examiners	by	request.	 	
	 16	
3. Analytical perspective: combining governmentality with 
ethnography of development 
In	investigating	how	development	is	done	in	practice,	I	employ	an	analytical	framework	that	combines	a	governmentality	approach	with	an	ethnographic	approach	to	the	study	of	development	work.	This	framework	and	its	components	will	be	presented	in	the	following.	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	will	explain	how	I	combine	concepts	from	the	two	different	approaches.	The	second	section	focuses	on	the	concept	of	‘regime	of	practices’	and	how	it	applies	to	the	practices	of	development	organizations.	The	third	section	will	present	the	ethnographic	approach	to	the	study	of	development	work.	The	remaining	four	sections	will	discuss	each	of	the	four	dimensions	of	a	‘regime	of	practices’,	combining	these	with	concepts	from	the	ethnographic	approach.	
Analytical framework The	theoretical	concepts	presented	in	this	chapter	have	their	foundations	in	two	theoretical	approaches.	Both	of	these	approaches	have	traditionally	been	associated	with	analyses	that	are	quite	different	from	the	present.	The	Foucauldian	governmentality	approach	comes	from	a	tradition	of	studying	the	workings	of	the	modern,	European	state,	whereas	ethnography	has	been	occupied	with	studies	of	the	local	and	the	other,	often	focusing	on	non-western	communities	(Mosse	2005b:	1).	Their	relevance	for	this	study	will	be	elaborated	on	below.	
Foucault’s	writings	on	the	various	ways	relations	of	power	unfold	in	practice	have	often	served	as	a	basis	upon	which	other	scholars	have	built	and	further	developed	their	theoretical	considerations.	The	concepts	and	approaches	used	in	this	thesis	emanate	from	Mitchell	Dean’s	work	on	governmentality	and	from	Carol	Bacchi’s	‘What’s	the	problem	represented	to	be?’	(WPR)	approach.	While	I	will	not	conduct	a	classic	governmentality	analysis,	using	the	‘regime	of	practices’	concept	as	a	central	concept	in	the	analytical	framework	still	allows	me	to	go	beyond	discourses	and	practices	that	are	sometimes	taken	for	granted	and	examine	the	processes	and	power	relations	that	have	made	these	seem	natural.	As	such,	this	approach	can	explore	how	governance	takes	place	through	the	practices	of	development	organizations,	and	further	enable	a	better	understanding	of	the	specific,	organized	ways	that	governance	operates	within	the	‘development	regime	of	practices’.	
Critics	of	the	governmentality	approach	argue	that	it	is	“empirically	weak	and	suspiciously	functionalist”	(Mosse	2005b:	14).	In	contrast,	the	ethnographic	approach	enables	an	analysis	that	is	empirically	closer	to	the	everyday	realities	and	embodied	actions	of	practitioners.	Thus,	by	bringing	in	
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some	of	the	insights	and	concepts	from	ethnographic	analyses	of	development	organizations,	this	analysis	will	not	start	from	scratch	in	the	investigation	of	the	characteristics	of	the	‘development	regime	of	practices’.	Concepts	such	as	‘rendering	technical’,	‘translation’	and	‘system	goals’	denote	some	of	the	practices	that	Li	and	Mosse	have	identified	within	development	organizations	(Li	2007;	Mosse	2005a).	They	will	be	used	to	examine	more	closely	the	actions	of	development	practitioners	that	comprise	development	practice	(as	I	did	not	do	observed	ethnography,	but	interviewed	a	number	of	development	practitioners).	
Despite	the	fact	that	the	theoretical	concepts	presented	in	this	chapter	stem	from	different	approaches,	they	are	compatible	if	combined	with	a	historical	constructivist	ontology.	This	means	that	the	social	reality	to	be	studied	is	seen	as	continuously	constructed	by	social	practices	in	an	interaction	between	the	names	that	are	given	to	a	certain	phenomenon	and	the	thing	itself.	Hacking	calls	this	‘dynamic	nominalism’	(Hacking	2006:	3–4).	He	argues	that	this	interaction	creates	a	looping	effect	in	which	the	object	of	study	becomes	a	‘moving	target’,	since	“our	investigations	interact	with	the	targets	themselves,	and	change	them”	(Hacking	2006:	2).	This	perspective	on	the	philosophy	of	science	enables	the	study	of	social	phenomenon	to	focus	not	only	on	their	current	characteristics,	but	also	on	the	history	of	how	they	came	to	be	constructed	in	this	way.	
Regime of practices The	concept	‘regime	of	practices’	comes	from	Foucault’s	governmentality	approach	to	the	analysis	of	government.	In	brief,	there	are	two	different	meanings	attached	to	the	term	‘governmentality’.	The	first	is	concerned	with	the	relation	between	thought	and	government,	building	on	the	notion	that	thinking	is	not	an	individual,	but	a	collective	activity.	Government	in	this	regard	is	concerned	with	the	‘conduct	of	conduct’,	that	is	how	government	seeks	to	shape	the	conduct	of	others	or	oneself	through	various	means	of	calculation,	techniques	and	forms	of	knowledge.	In	this	way,	government	shapes	the	field	of	action,	and	it	can	be	understood	as	a	specific	form	of	power,	distinct	from	sovereignty	and	discipline	(Dean	2010:	17–24).	In	the	second	meaning,	governmentality	is	a	historical	phenomenon	that	denotes	the	emergence	of	a	specific	form	of	power	in	western	European	societies.	In	this	sense,	government	is	concerned	with	the	welfare	of	the	population	and	the	economic	aspect	of	society	(Dean	2010:	28–29).	
The	‘regime	of	practices’	concept	has	been	elaborated	on	by	Dean,	who	defines	it	as	“more	or	less	organized	ways,	at	any	given	time	and	place,	we	think	about,	reform	and	practice	such	things	as	caring,	administering,	counselling,	curing,	punishing,	educating	and	so	on”	(Dean	2010:	31).	Governance	takes	place	through	these	regimes	of	practices,	which	are	composed	of	routinized	and	ritualized	ways	of	
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doing	things	at	a	given	place	and	time	(Dean	2010:	31).	A	regime	of	practices	includes	“practices	for	the	production	of	truth	and	knowledge”	and	“multiple	forms	of	practical,	technical	and	calculative	rationality”	(Dean	2010:	28).	For	the	purpose	of	the	analysis	in	this	thesis,	the	‘thing’	that	the	regime	of	practices	regards	is	development	work.	By	employing	this	concept	as	part	of	my	analytical	framework,	I	take	as	a	starting	point	that	a	regime	of	practices	exists	within	the	international	development	community,	or	in	other	words	that	the	practices	of	development	organizations	are	not	merely	disconnected,	disorganized	actions	of	individual	organizations.	This	assumption	will	be	tested	in	so	far	as	the	analysis	is	able	to	identify	patterns	and	similarities	in	the	practices	investigated.	
Employing	this	concept	from	the	governmentality	literature	is	not	an	obvious	choice	considering	my	object	of	analysis	is	the	practices	of	development	organizations,	which	are	not	normally	thought	of	as	governing	actors.	However,	when	one	considers	the	fact	that	government	is	defined	as	“any	attempt	to	shape	with	some	degree	of	deliberation	aspects	of	our	behaviour	according	to	particular	sets	of	norms	and	for	a	variety	of	ends”	(Dean	2010:	18),	it	becomes	clear	that	development	work	can	be	considered	government	in	this	sense.	Development	organizations	constantly	attempt	to	shape	the	behavior	of	aid	recipients	in	order	to	further	their	goals	of	poverty	reduction,	socioeconomic	development	and	respect	for	human	rights,	to	name	a	few.	Furthermore,	governmentality	is	precisely	the	form	of	power	that	emanates	from	the	concern	for	the	well-being	of	the	population	at	large	(Dean	2010:	28,	34).	In	development,	the	overall	goal	seems	to	be	exactly	this:	the	well-being	of	the	world’s	population.	This	is	however	also	where	my	analysis	departs	somewhat	from	traditional	governmentality	studies,	in	that	it	operates	in	the	international	sphere	and	not	within	a	national	society.	
Governmentality	also	entails	a	utopian	aspect,	as	it	presupposes	that	effective	government	is	possible,	that	“we	can	‘make	things	better’”,	and	specifically	that	the	intentions	of	government	will	match	the	outcome	(Dean	2010:	44).	Development	work	relies	on	a	similar	notion	that	the	world	can	be	improved,	otherwise	it	would	be	pointless	to	do	development	work.	Consequently,	the	governmentality	approach,	and	specifically	the	concept	‘regime	of	practices’	with	its	focus	on	how	government	takes	place,	appears	to	be	relevant	and	productive	for	the	analysis	of	this	thesis.	
According	to	Dean,	there	are	four	dimensions	to	a	regime	of	practices:	1)	ways	of	seeing	things	(field	of	visibility),	2)	ways	of	thinking	and	using	knowledge	(episteme),	3)	ways	of	acting	and	intervening	(techne)	and	4)	forming	of	identities	(Dean	2010:	33).	These	dimensions	can	be	analyzed	one	by	one	as	they	presuppose	one	another,	but	are	still	relatively	independent	(Dean	2010:	44).	In	order	to	form	a	useful	analytical	framework	for	the	analysis,	I	have	chosen	to	organize	the	theoretical	considerations	according	to	the	four	dimensions.	In	connection	with	each	of	these	dimensions,	concepts	from	Bacchi’s	
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WPR	approach	and	the	ethnographic	approach	will	be	drawn	in	to	complement	and	support	the	understanding	of	each	dimension’s	relevance	for	the	study	of	development	organizations.	
Ethnography of development An	ethnography	of	development	is	concerned	with	“how	development	projects	work”	and	“how	‘success’	is	produced”	(Mosse	2005a:	8),	that	is,	how	development	organizations	attempt	to	control	the	interpretation	of	events.	In	this	regard,	the	object	of	study	is	both	the	practices	of	development	practitioners	within	their	organization	and	their	practices	in	relation	to	other	actors.	The	study	of	the	practices	of	development	organizations	is	relatively	new	within	the	ethnographic	field,	and	it	emanates	from	a	general	move	away	from	solely	studying	the	local	and	the	other,	towards	studies	that	explore	different	manifestations	of	local-global	relations	(Mosse	2005b:	1).	
One	of	the	main	authors	of	ethnographic	studies	of	development	work	is	Mosse,	who	has	analyzed	the	development	practices	in	relation	to	a	British	agricultural	development	project	in	India	during	the	1990’s	in	his	book	‘Cultivating	Development’	(Mosse	2005a).	In	this	study,	Mosse	challenges	both	the	notion	that	the	main	function	of	policy	texts	is	to	guide	practice	and	that	the	categorization	of	a	project	as	a	success	or	a	failure	depends	on	its	ability	to	create	the	desired	change	(Mosse	2005a:	14–19).	As	such,	the	concepts	from	this	study	enable	the	analysis	to	question	the	official	functions	and	aims	of	development	practices.	
Another	central	contribution	to	this	field	of	study	is	Li’s	book	‘The	Will	to	Improve’,	which	deals	with	resettlement	projects	in	Indonesia	from	the	end	of	the	19th	century	until	today	(Li	2007).	Li	combines	an	ethnographic	approach	to	development	with	a	governmentality	approach,	as	she	argues	that	the	implementation	of	such	projects	is	done	through	governance	that	seeks	to	reform	the	subject.	In	her	study,	Li	finds	that	two	practices	are	central	to	the	resettlement	projects,	‘problematization’	and	‘rendering	technical’,	which	will	be	elaborated	on	below	(Li	2007:	7).	The	concepts	from	Li’s	study	contribute	to	the	identification	of	specific	governance	practices	that	are	characteristic	for	the	development	organizations.	
Theoretical	concepts	and	insights	developed	by	these	authors	will	be	used	in	the	analytical	framework	in	order	to	map	some	of	the	practices	that	are	central	within	the	development	community.	In	addition	to	the	two	authors	mentioned	above,	the	analytical	framework	draws	on	a	number	of	other	authors.	Berg	and	Ufford’s	(2005)	considerations	of	the	role	of	order	in	development	and	the	functions	of	evaluations	in	development	organizations	are	brought	in.	Cornwall’s	(2010)	arguments	on	the	role	of	development	language	and	‘buzzwords’	are	presented.	Whitfield’s	(2007)	observations	about	the	
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effects	of	the	‘ownership’	agenda	on	donor/recipient	identities	are	used	to	supplement	Li’s	writings	on	this.	And	lastly,	specific	points	made	by	King	and	McGrath	(2004)	are	drawn	on	in	order	to	characterize	the	development	knowledge	system.	
The	benefit	of	an	ethnographic	approach	is	that	it	illuminates	how	the	everyday	practices	of	development	practitioners	can	amount	to	common	practices	within	the	development	community	that	can	have	far-reaching	consequences.	As	such,	it	links	the	local	with	the	global	and	supplements	the	governmentality	approach	with	an	actor-centric	perspective.	I	will	not	employ	the	full	theoretical	framework	of	any	of	the	authors	presented	above,	but	rather	use	their	concepts	as	a	‘heuristic	framework’,	in	which	selected	concepts	and	insights	can	guide	the	way	the	empirical	data	is	approached	and	structure	the	investigation,	in	line	with	Lund’s	use	of	the	term	(2014:	229).	The	following	four	sections	of	this	chapter	will	present	the	four	dimensions	of	a	regime	of	practices,	discussing	theoretical	concepts	from	both	the	governmentality	and	ethnographic	approach.	
Field of visibility: development policy and problematizations One	characteristic	of	a	regime	of	practices	is	the	way	it	illuminates	that	which	is	to	be	governed.	The	field	of	visibility	defines	some	objects	and	hides	others,	thereby	creating	the	space	for	action	(Dean	2010:	41).	Constructing	something	as	a	problem	is	called	problematizing	it,	and	it	is	this	aspect	of	the	field	of	visibility	that	I	will	focus	on	here.	Following	Foucault’s	definition	of	problematizations,	we	can	understand	them	as	a	“set	of	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	that	makes	something	enter	into	the	play	of	the	true	and	the	false	and	constitutes	an	object	for	thought”	(Foucault	1988:	257).	Thus,	it	is	this	process	that	defines	which	problems	are	to	be	solved.	
Problematizations	are	not	separate	from	practices,	but	problematizations	emerge	from	practices.	For	instance,	the	practices	of	collecting	certain	actions,	thoughts,	behaviors	and	words	into	a	specific	category,	creates	this	as	something	that	is	understood	as	real,	or	as	a	problem	(Bacchi	2012b:	3).	According	to	Li,	the	practices	of	development	organizations	rely	heavily	on	the	use	of	experts,	who	are	able	to	take	a	political	problem,	“removing	it	from	the	realm	of	political	discourse,	and	recasting	it	in	the	neutral	language	of	science”	(Li	2007:	10).	This	is	the	process	that	Li	calls	‘rendering	technical’	and	it	serves	the	purpose	of	establishing	this	problem	as	one	that	can	be	solved	by	the	technical	solution	that	development	organizations	offer.	Also,	it	rebuffs	criticism,	thereby	enabling	the	uninterrupted	practice	of	governance	by	the	development	organization	(Li	2007:	7–10).	Cornwall	argues	that	using	development	language	and	development	‘buzzwords’	supports	this	process,	as	development	language	consists	of	feel-good	terms	with	a	vague	and	ambiguous	meaning.	These	are	often	constructed	to	sound	intellectual	and	scientific,	while	at	the	same	time	placing	“the	sanctity	of	its	goals	beyond	
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reproach”	(Cornwall	2010:	2).	As	such,	this	type	of	problematization	is	beneficial	for	development	organizations	as	it	helps	gather	support	for	their	development	work.	
In	order	to	be	able	to	investigate	how	problematizations	creates	something	as	a	problem,	Bacchi	has	developed	an	approach	to	the	study	of	policy	papers,	the	‘What’s	the	problem	represented	to	be?’	(WPR)	approach.	She	argues	that	“all	policy	proposals	rely	on	problematizations	which	can	be	opened	up	and	studied”	(Bacchi	2012b:	5).	By	employing	the	WPR	approach	to	the	study	of	policy	papers	“problematizations	are	recognized	as	powerful	and	yet	contingent	ways	of	producing	the	“real”.	In	effect	governing	takes	place	through	problematizations”	(Bacchi	2012b:	7).	Thus,	problematizations	are	not	harmless	ways	of	describing	the	‘reality’;	they	have	consequences	for	the	social	reality	that	they	are	constructing.	
Bacchi’s	WPR	approach	involves	asking	six	questions	when	analyzing	a	policy	document:	
1. “What’s	the	‘problem’	[…]	represented	to	be	in	a	specific	policy	or	policy	proposal?	2. What	presuppositions	or	assumptions	underpin	this	representation	of	the	‘problem’?	3. How	has	this	representation	of	the	‘problem’	come	about?	4. What	is	left	unproblematic	in	this	problem	representation?	Where	are	the	silences?	Can	the	‘problem’	be	thought	about	differently?	5. What	effects	are	produced	by	this	representation	of	the	‘problem’?	6. How/where	has	this	representation	of	the	‘problem’	been	produced,	disseminated	and	defended?	How	has	it	been	(or	could	it	be)	questioned,	disrupted	and	replaced?”	(Bacchi	2012a:	21).	
The	WPR	approach	will	be	used	in	the	first	part	of	the	analysis,	that	is,	in	Chapter	4.	In	this	chapter,	policy	papers	from	the	troika	countries	will	be	analyzed	with	regard	to	Bacchi’s	six	questions	in	order	to	gain	insights	into	the	underlying	assumptions	that	form	the	way	South	Sudan	is	represented	as	posing	a	problem	to	the	international	society,	and	to	the	development	community	in	particular.	The	questions	will	not	be	systematically	applied	in	the	analysis,	but	rather	the	themes	from	the	questions	will	appear	as	they	are	relevant	for	the	specific	policy	papers.	The	analysis	will	touch	upon,	but	not	provide	exhaustive	accounts	of	the	origins	and	history	of	the	specific	problem	representations	(question	3	and	6).	Rather,	focus	will	be	turned	to	the	effects	of	the	problematization	(question	5).	
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Episteme: rationality and knowledge for development The	second	dimension	of	a	regime	of	practices	regards	the	way	governing	relates	to	thought,	knowledge	and	truth.	Dean	calls	this	the	episteme	of	government.	Government	practices	are	both	informed	by	knowledge	and	engaged	in	creating	knowledge.	Dean	poses	the	central	question	regarding	this	dimension	of	a	regime	of	practices	as	“what	forms	of	thought,	knowledge,	expertise,	strategies,	means	of	calculation,	or	rationality	are	employed	in	practices	of	governing?”	(Dean	2010:	42).	
According	to	Li,	the	rationality	of	the	governmentality	form	of	power	is	based	on	calculation,	in	the	manner	that	“government	requires	that	the	“right	manner”	be	defined,	distinct	“finalities”	prioritized,	and	tactics	finely	tuned	to	achieve	optimal	results”	(Li	2007:	6).	With	regard	to	development	organizations,	this	rationality	is	employed	in	order	to	attempt	to	calculate	which	interventions	and	project	designs	will	yield	the	beneficial	results	wanted.	Consequently,	the	favored	type	of	knowledge	is	one	that	can	assist	development	organizations	in	making	this	calculation.	
Mosse	argues	that	in	the	development	community,	the	knowledge	system	favors	knowledge	that	works	on	a	general	level	and	prescribes	universal	solutions	over	contextual	knowledge	(Mosse	2005b:	6).		This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	role	of	deployed	project	staff,	which	is	most	likely	to	gain	detailed	contextual	knowledge,	is	most	often	to	implement	a	project	that	has	already	been	planned	in	detail	at	the	organization’s	headquarters.	Furthermore,	such	project	staff	is	quite	often	rotated	between	different	localities,	preventing	the	organization	from	gaining	any	experts	with	thorough	knowledge	of	a	specific	country	context	(King	and	McGrath	2004:	107).	
Development	organizations	are	also	involved	in	creating	knowledge.	According	to	the	organizations	themselves,	they	conduct	evaluations	of	their	projects	in	order	to	create	new	knowledge	that	they	can	use	in	the	planning	of	future	projects.	Another	function	of	evaluations	is	accountability,	in	other	words	to	ensure	that	development	projects	are	achieving	the	expected	results.	Berg	and	Ufford	(2005:	200)	argue	that	in	order	to	be	able	to	make	a	clear	distinction	between	success	and	failure,	development	organizations	need	to	gather	quantitative	data	about	their	projects.	This	results	in	a	knowledge	system	where	knowledge	based	on	quantitative	data	is	seen	as	more	valid	than	that	based	on	qualitative	data.	
These	theoretical	considerations	on	how	knowledge	is	used	and	created	within	the	development	regime	of	practices	will	be	employed	in	the	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	The	concepts	presented	here	will	enable	the	analysis	to	investigate	what	forms	of	knowledge	and	rationality	that	development	organizations	have	used	in	their	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	thus	providing	a	central	piece	of	the	puzzle	that	will	lead	to	an	answer	to	the	second	sub-question.	
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Techne: project design and implementation The	third	dimension	of	a	regime	of	practices	regards	the	“specific	ways	of	acting,	intervening	and	directing”	(Dean	2010:	33).	These	are	the	technical	means	that	are	used	to	achieve	the	aims	of	government,	or	in	other	words	the	techne	of	government.	As	such,	it	is	also	the	technical	means	that	can	limit	the	forms	of	governance	that	are	possible	in	a	given	situation.	The	central	question	here	is	“by	what	means,	mechanisms,	procedures,	instruments,	tactics,	techniques,	technologies	and	vocabularies	is	authority	constituted	and	rule	accomplished?”	(Dean	2010:	42).	
The	technical	means	of	development	organizations	are	tied	to	the	characteristics	of	the	development	project,	as	they	provide	the	frame	within	which	action	takes	place.	The	execution	of	development	projects	is	enmeshed	in	established	procedures,	techniques	and	vocabularies.	For	example,	the	project	design	process	usually	entails	formulating	a	‘theory	of	change’	and	carefully	listing	the	expected	outputs,	outcomes	and	impact	of	the	project	in	a	Logical	Framework	(Logframe)	(Mosse	2005a:	38).	The	processes,	which	lead	to	the	formulation	of	project	designs	are	described	by	Li,	who	argues	that	it	is	necessary	to	“translate	messy	conjunctures,	with	all	the	processes	that	run	through	them,	into	linear	narratives	of	problems,	interventions,	and	beneficial	results”	(Li	2007:	4).	The	aim	of	this	process	of	translation	is	to	create	a	sense	of	order	as	development	organizations	often	work	in	an	environment	that	may	be	chaotic	and	unpredictable.	Berg	and	Ufford	go	so	far	as	to	say	that	development	practitioners	are	addicted	to	promises	of	order.	This	means	that	the	development	community	is	seriously	out	of	touch	with	‘reality’,	and	that	development	becomes	a	practice	directed	by	hope	and	dreams	more	than	by	realistic	expectations	(Berg	and	Ufford	2005:	203).	
‘Translation’	is	also	a	central	process	for	Mosse,	who	argues	that	project	designs	must	be	characterized	by	a	productive	ambiguity	in	order	to	gain	support	for	common	development	narratives	and	encompass	contradictory	interests	in	development	projects	(Mosse	2005a:	9).	Therefore,	development	practitioners	have	to	continuously	translate	policy	into	practice	and	practice	into	policy,	in	order	to	be	able	to	work	in	a	field	where	various	actors	have	different	institutional	languages	and	different	interests	in	the	projects.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	important	for	development	organizations	to	gather	political	support	and	legitimize	the	choices	of	the	organization	(Mosse	2005a:	21).	Mosse	further	argues	that	the	implementation	of	projects	is	not	ruled	by	formal	policy	and	design,	but	rather	by	the	pursuit	of	‘system	goals’.	‘System	goals’	are	goals	that	serve	the	organization’s	own	interests,	first	and	foremost	institutional	maintenance	and	survival	(Mosse	2005a:	103–104).	However,	implementation	is	not	completely	removed	from	policy	and	project	design,	since	the	organization	still	needs	to	frame	their	actions	as	coherent	with	formal	policy	in	order	to	retain	legitimacy.	
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These	theoretical	considerations	regarding	which	technical	means	development	organizations	can	use	to	govern	will	be	used	to	substantiate	the	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	The	concepts	presented	in	this	section	will	allow	the	analysis	to	investigate	how	such	techniques	are	used	by	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	and	how	they	enable	and/or	limit	their	ability	to	govern	effectively.	As	such,	they	will	bring	focus	to	another	important	dimension	of	development	organizations’	practices	in	South	Sudan.	
Formation of identities: donor and recipient roles The	fourth	dimension	of	a	regime	of	practices	deals	with	the	individual	and	collective	identities	that	are	formed	and	used	by	government.	Here,	Dean	proposes	that	we	ask	the	questions	“what	forms	of	person,	self	and	identity	are	presupposed	by	different	practices	of	government	and	what	sorts	of	transformation	do	these	practices	seek?	What	statuses,	capacities,	attributes	and	orientations	are	assumed	of	those	who	exercise	authority	[…]	and	those	who	are	to	be	governed	[…]?”	(Dean	2010:	43).	Government	cannot	dictate	identities,	but	they	can	promote	certain	capacities,	which	might	be	internalized	by	other	actors,	who	then	come	to	view	themselves	through	that	capacity.	This	process	forms	identities	(Dean	2010:	43–44).	
According	to	Li,	development	organizations	operate	with	the	position	or	identity	of	‘trustee’,	which	she	defines	by	“the	claim	to	know	how	others	should	live,	to	know	what	is	best	for	them,	to	know	what	they	need”	(Li	2007:	4).	In	this	way,	the	‘trustee’	identity	becomes	contingent	upon	the	attribute	of	expertise.	Implicit	in	this	identity	construction	is	the	notion	that	development	organizations	are	not	attempting	to	dominate	others,	rather	“Their	intentions	are	benevolent,	even	utopian”	(Li	2007:	5).	This	identity	enables	development	organizations	to	govern	the	actions	of	others,	while	legitimizing	such	practices	by	claiming	that	they	are	simply	shaping	the	space	for	action	of	individuals	for	the	greater	good	of	a	population.	
Identity	formation	within	the	development	regime	of	practices	is	also	characterized	by	a	sharp	distinction	between	donors	and	recipients	of	aid.	Recipients’	identities	are	characterized	by	the	attribute	of	“improvability”	(Li	2007:	15),	that	is	someone	who	can	be	changed	for	the	better.	Li	further	argues	that	the	view	of	aid	recipients	within	development	practice	is	still	dominated	by	a	‘structure	of	permanent	deferral’,	wherein	the	recipient	identity	is	linked	to	the	idea	of	subjects	that	are	“destined	to	become	rights-bearing	individuals,	but	always	too	immature	to	exercise	those	rights”	(Wilder	in	Li	2007:	15).	The	combination	of	the	development	organization	identity	as	a	‘trustee’	and	the	recipient	identity	as	an	improvable	subject	lead	to	a	relationship	were	the	development	organization	is	expected	to	give	advice	and	the	recipient	is	expected	to	follow	this	advice.	
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Whitfield	argues	that	the	contemporary	focus	on	local	‘ownership’	as	well	as	‘partnership’	between	donors	and	recipients	does	not	imply	that	donor	and	recipient	identities	are	characterized	by	equality.	Instead,	it	means	that	donors	will	not	impose	certain	conditions	for	aid,	but	rather	suggest	which	changes	they	expect.	Recipients	in	turn	become	skillful	in	speaking	development	language,	enabling	them	to	anticipate	what	donors	want	to	hear	and	adapt	their	initiatives	accordingly	(Whitfield	2007:	147–148).	In	this	regard,	the	‘partnership’	agenda	reproduces	the	identity	formations	that	Li	describes,	whereby	recipients	of	aid	are	expected	to	follow	the	advice	of	donors,	who	have	the	needed	expertise.	But	it	also	masks	this	relationship,	making	it	seem	like	recipients	and	donors	are	engaged	in	an	equal	partnership.	
The	theoretical	considerations	presented	in	this	section	will	be	applied	in	the	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	This	part	of	the	analysis	will	also	examine	how	the	interaction	between	international	development	organizations	and	the	government	of	South	Sudan	(GOSS)	has	influenced	development	work	in	the	country,	and	how	these	actors	have	engaged	in	identity	formation	practices,	both	with	regards	to	their	own	identity	and	that	of	others.	By	combining	the	theoretical	considerations	regarding	the	second	(episteme),	third	(techne)	and	fourth	(identity	formation)	dimensions	of	the	regime	of	practices	in	the	analysis	in	Chapter	5,	I	will	be	able	to	give	a	broad	characterization	of	the	practices	of	development	organizations	in	South	Sudan.	However,	the	analysis	will	not	be	organized	according	to	these	dimensions,	but	rather	according	to	the	analytical	arguments	that	originate	from	the	empirical	data.	
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4. Problematizing South Sudan: a case of fragility or 
underdevelopment? 
In	2011,	South	Sudan	had	just	gained	independence	and	was	facing	an	array	of	challenges	in	getting	the	new	country	up	and	running,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	1.	At	this	point,	the	international	society’s	donor	agencies	were	publishing	their	first	strategies	for	how	they	would	assist	South	Sudan	in	meeting	these	challenges.	These	policy	papers	contributed	to	constructing	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task,	and	this	chapter	will	explore	how	this	was	done,	thus	answering	the	first	sub-question:	How	has	the	troika	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task?	The	first	two	sections	will	briefly	outline	the	histories	of	the	fragile	states	agenda	and	South	Sudan	respectively.	The	next	three	sections	will	provide	analyses	of	three	key	policy	papers,	one	from	each	of	the	troika	states,	in	order	to	explore	how	these	three	states	have	problematized	South	Sudan	and	how	their	problematizations	cohere	and	differ.	Lastly,	I	will	explore	which	effects	are	produced	by	the	troika’s	problem	representation.	
The significance of the fragile states agenda The	fragile	states	agenda	emerged	during	the	1990’s.	The	concept	of	‘fragile	states’	was	used	by	scholars	alongside	similar	concepts	such	as	‘quasi-states’,	‘failed	states’	and	‘weak	states’	to	describe	a	phenomenon,	which	appeared	on	the	international	agenda	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	(Helman	and	Ratner	1993;	Jackson	1990;	Migdal	1988).	States	that	had	been	artificially	supported	by	the	major	powers	of	the	Cold	War	were	weakened	by	the	new	world	order,	in	which	the	third	world	became	less	important	to	the	major	powers	as	grounds	for	ideological	rivalry.	At	the	same	time,	globalization	led	to	a	‘crisis	of	the	state’,	in	which	transnational	flows	limited	the	viable	policy	options	of	individual	states	and	allowed	armed	groups	who	wanted	to	challenge	the	state’s	power	to	benefit	from	transnational	economic	flows	(Robinson	2007).	
Today,	the	term	‘fragile	state’	is	widely	used,	even	though	no	consensus	exists	on	the	defining	features	of	a	fragile	state	and	on	which	states	should	be	considered	fragile	(Carment	et	al.	2010).	The	strong	link	between	weak	statehood	and	the	outbreak	of	violent	conflict	led	to	a	convergence	between	security	and	development	interests	and	a	growing	understanding	that	the	international	society	needed	to	do	something	about	the	‘problem’	with	fragile	states	(Grimm	et	al.	2014).	The	notion	that	international	actors	should	be	engaged	in	the	process	of	building	the	state	in	fragile	states	is	relatively	new,	and	it	stems	from	a	widely	held	perception	that	“external	statebuilding	is	necessary	to	stabilise	the	international	system	and	to	protect	the	people	of	weakly	institutionalised	non-western	states	from	
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fear	and	want”	(Guevara	2012:	2).	Statebuilding	work	is	usually	done	by	development	organizations,	which	view	it	as	one	aspect	of	their	development	engagement	in	a	fragile	state.	
The	process	of	statebuilding	is	fundamentally	different	from	the	way	European	states	were	formed	through	wars	and	other	historical	processes	that	did	not	have	a	modern	state	as	its	end	goal	from	the	beginning	(Tilly	1985).	Such	indigenous	processes	are	called	state	formation,	whereas	statebuilding	refers	to	a	process	that	is	intentional	and	led	by	external	actors	(Richmond	2013:	382).	Statebuilding	activities	often	involve	the	more	or	less	direct	transferring	of	institutions	found	in	western	states	to	developing	states	(Guevara	2012:	1).	In	many	cases,	those	who	are	writing	about	and	engaged	in	statebuilding	fail	to	define	their	understanding	of	the	state,	or	in	other	words	what	it	is	they	want	to	build.		Instead	they	take	a	Weberian	notion	of	statehood	as	their	starting	point,	one	that	emphasizes	state	institutions	as	the	defining	feature	of	statehood	and	tends	to	“treat	legitimacy	either	as	a	mere	consequence	of	functioning	institutions	or	as	a	process	of	legitimization”	(Lemay-Hébert	2013:	6).	Given	the	amount	of	attention	and	focus	on	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states	and	statebuilding,	it	is	interesting	to	explore	which	role	it	plays	in	relation	to	South	Sudan.	
South Sudan: the history of a new and fragile state When	South	Sudan	gained	independence	in	2011	it	became	the	world’s	newest	state.	South	Sudan	is	located	in	central-eastern	Africa	and	is	roughly	the	same	size	as	France	(619,745	km2	to	be	precise)	(Talmage	and	Maneice	2016).	The	population	consists	of	a	variety	of	ethnic	groups,	of	which	the	Dinka	and	the	Nuer	are	the	largest	groups.	South	Sudan	is	a	low-income	country,	even	though	it	has	significant	natural	resources	that	include	oil	and	highly	fertile	agricultural	land	(Central	Intelligence	Agency	2016).	
Sudan’s	long	history	of	civil	war	began	at	independence	in	1955.	In	1972	the	Addis	Ababa	Agreement	led	to	the	end	of	fighting,	but	the	civil	war	was	reignited	already	in	1983,	when	the	second	civil	war	began	(Öhm	2015:	15).	During	the	second	civil	war,	the	largest	rebel	group	was	the	Sudan	People’s	Liberation	Movement/Army	(SPLM/A),	which	fought	for	greater	autonomy	from	the	central	government.	One	of	the	issues	that	divided	the	government	based	in	Khartoum	and	the	southern	population	was	the	introduction	of	Sharia	law	in	1983,	since	the	majority	of	the	population	in	the	south	adhere	to	Christian	or	animist	religions.	The	parties	reached	a	peace	agreement	in	1989,	but	a	military	coup	led	by	Omar	Al-Bashir	(current	president	of	Sudan)	spoiled	the	implementation	and	the	civil	war	continued	(Zapata	2011).	
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The	territory	that	constitutes	what	is	today	South	Sudan	has	long	been	a	place	where	development	organizations	have	worked.	The	continuous	fighting	between	the	government	and	the	SPLM/A	led	to	a	large	proportion	of	the	population	in	the	south	being	either	killed,	internally	displaced	or	forced	to	flee	the	country	(Zambakari	2012:	516).	During	some	periods,	the	Sudanese	government	was	completely	absent	from	large	parts	of	the	south,	which	was	held	by	the	rebel	group.	This	meant	that	the	southern	part	of	Sudan	had	long	been	heavily	reliant	on	development	organizations	to	provide	humanitarian	aid	and	basic	services.	Furthermore,	Sudan	experienced	severe	famines	in	both	1988	and	1998,	which	prompted	development	organizations	to	increase	the	amount	of	humanitarian	aid	to	Sudan	(Öhm	2015:	84–86).	In	1989,	the	UN	and	several	NGOs	created	the	Operation	Lifeline	Sudan	(OLS),	where	they	worked	together	to	provide	humanitarian	aid	to	people	in	southern	Sudan.	Both	the	government	of	Sudan	and	the	SPLM	agreed	to	letting	the	aid	organizations	access	SPLM-held	areas	(Öhm	2015:	86).	Yet	it	was	only	with	the	adoption	of	Ground	Rules	for	the	OLS	in	1995	that	the	development	dimension	came	to	the	fore,	as	the	rules	added	a	paragraph	on	capacity	building:	“Strengthening	local	capacity	to	prevent	future	crises	and	emergencies	[…]	is	an	integral	part	of	OLS’s	humanitarian	mandate”	(Bradbury	et	al.	2000:	74).	
(Source:	UN	Geospatial	Information	Section	2011) 
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The	second	civil	war	ended	with	the	signing	of	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	(CPA)	in	2005,	which	prescribed	a	six-year	interim	period	in	which	semi-autonomous	governance	structures	would	be	set	up	for	the	south.	According	to	the	CPA,	this	period	would	be	followed	by	a	referendum	on	independence	for	the	south	in	2011.	When	long-term	leader	of	the	SPLM/A	John	Garang	died	in	a	helicopter	crash	not	long	after	the	signing	of	the	CPA,	Salva	Kiir	was	appointed	president	of	South	Sudan’s	regional	government	and	leader	of	the	SPLM/A,	and	Riek	Machar	became	vice-president.	At	the	referendum,	98,8%	of	the	southern	population	voted	for	independence	(Sarwar	2011:	228).	Thus,	on	9	July	2011	South	Sudan	declared	independence	and	was	recognized	as	a	sovereign	state	both	by	Sudan	and	by	the	international	society,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	1	(Kron	2011;	Pop	2011).	The	new	South	Sudanese	state	was	highly	dependent	on	oil	revenues	and	when	the	government	in	early	2012	decided	to	halt	oil	production	due	to	disagreements	with	the	north	over	the	price	for	using	their	pipelines,	the	state	quickly	used	up	all	of	its	available	resources	(Waal	2014:	39–40).	Thus,	the	new	country	was	still	highly	reliant	on	foreign	aid.	
Even	though	no	consensus	exists	regarding	the	defining	features	of	a	fragile	state,	it	is	clear	that	South	Sudan	would	fall	within	the	category	according	to	most	definitions.	The	2013	Failed	State	Index,	which	ranked	South	Sudan	as	the	fourth	least	stable	state	out	of	178	states,	notes	that	South	Sudan	has	“none	of	the	actual	underpinnings	of	viable	statehood”	(The	Fund	for	Peace	2013:	24).	This	reflects	the	fact	that	“South	Sudan	suffers	from	both	lack	of	administrative	capacity	[…]	and	chronic	underdevelopment”	(Belloni	2011:	424).	Accordingly,	one	might	even	contend	that	South	Sudan	is	a	textbook	example	of	a	fragile	state,	were	it	not	for	the	fact	that	South	Sudan	does	not	have	a	long	history	of	juridical	statehood	as	most	fragile	states	do.	Thus,	the	following	analysis	of	how	the	troika	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task	will	also	look	at	how	they	relate	to	the	fragility	of	the	South	Sudanese	state	in	their	problem	representations.1	
DFID: the problem of underdevelopment In	2011	the	UK’s	Department	for	International	Development	(DFID)	published	the	‘Operational	Plan	2011-2015’,	which	lays	out	their	activities	in	South	Sudan	during	the	following	four	years.	The	plan	includes	a	brief	description	of	the	country	context,	an	outline	of	DFID’s	vision	for	the	country,	a	list	of	the	expected	results,	a	description	of	how	the	results	will	be	delivered,	including	an	overall	budget,	a																																									 																					1	Since	2011,	the	situation	in	South	Sudan	has	changed.	Civil	war	broke	out	in	December	2013,	following	a	split	within	the	ruling	party	(Johnson	2014).	In	mid-2014,	president	Kiir	and	former	vice-president	and	rebel	leader	Machar	signed	a	peace	deal.	Implementation	of	this	deal	is	still	underway	(International	Crisis	Group	2016).	
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section	on	how	value	for	money	will	be	ensured,	a	description	of	how	the	projects	will	be	monitored	and	evaluated	and	lastly	a	section	on	transparency	(DFID	2011a).	It	qualifies	as	a	policy	paper,	because	it	describes	DFID’s	intent	to	act	in	a	specific	way.	
The	Operational	Plan	points	to	a	variety	of	challenges	facing	South	Sudan.	These	challenges	seem	to	be	derived	from	a	presupposition	about	what	a	modern	state	should	look	like,	or	in	other	words	a	Weberian	notion	of	statehood,	as	described	above.	One	paragraph	lists	a	number	of	areas	where	South	Sudan	falls	short	of	this	‘notion	of	statehood’,	pointing	out	that	South	Sudan	“will	emerge	as	a	new	state	with	high	levels	of	poverty,	inadequate	government	capacity,	an	almost	exclusive	reliance	on	oil	income,	high	unemployment,	a	bloated	security	sector	[…]	and	an	overmanned	public	sector”	(DFID	2011a:	2).	Furthermore,	the	plan	points	out	that	South	Sudan	lacks	stability,	a	democratic	and	accountable	state,	human	rights,	a	professional	army,	adequate	infrastructure	and	provision	of	basic	services.	Thus,	the	overall	problem	in	South	Sudan	seems	to	be	represented	to	be	‘underdevelopment’	as	compared	to	the	modern	state,	even	though	the	term	‘underdevelopment’	is	not	explicitly	used	in	the	policy	paper.	
A	consequence	of	this	problem	representation	is	that	the	policy	paper	fails	to	consider	whether	all	of	these	deficiencies	are	necessary	to	prioritize	at	this	point	in	time,	and	relatedly	whether	some	of	them	are	more	important	than	others.	For	example,	the	policy	paper	defines	both	the	‘bloated	security	sector’	and	the	lack	of	basic	services	as	problems,	without	taking	into	account	that	the	salaries	paid	to	security	sector	employees	actually	function	as	a	kind	of	welfare	system.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	an	officer	in	the	army,	police	or	fire	brigade	is	able	to	support	his	extended	family	of	20-30	people	through	his	salary	alone	(Expert	B	2016:	159–162).	The	development	language	that	is	used	in	the	policy	paper	leads	attention	towards	the	ways	in	which	South	Sudan	is	lacking	compared	to	western	standards	of	human	rights,	democracy	and	good	governance.	But	in	doing	this,	it	also	diverts	attention	away	from	the	way	that	the	state	is	actually	functioning,	which	is	for	example	by	allowing	the	large	number	of	security	sector	employees	to	distribute	wealth	to	their	family,	thereby	redistributing	the	state’s	resources	to	a	large	number	of	people.	Yet	in	the	development	terms	of	the	Operational	Plan	this	is	defined	as	corruption	paired	with	a	bloated	security	sector,	thereby	constituting	only	‘problems’	and	not	solutions.	
The	Operational	Plan	further	argues	that	the	GOSS	is	unable	and/or	unwilling	to	solve	the	country’s	problem	on	their	own,	for	example	when	it	states	that	the	GOSS	“has	the	resources	it	requires	to	eliminate	poverty:	the	challenge	is	to	support	a	demilitarisation	of	public	expenditures	and	to	build	the	capacity	and	the	political	will	to	direct	the	resources	away	from	the	core	groups	at	the	centre	to	a	more	equitable	distribution	focusing	on	productive	and	social	sectors	in	the	states”	(DFID	2011a:	3).	
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What	this	quote	suggests	is	that	it	is	up	to	DFID	and	its	international	partners	to	generate	‘political	will’	in	South	Sudan,	in	other	words	convince	the	GOSS	that	eliminating	poverty	is	the	right	thing	to	do	instead	of	channeling	funds	through	a	patronage	system	that	secures	political	support	for	the	government.	‘Political	will’	can	be	defined	as	“the	commitment	of	actors	to	undertake	actions	to	achieve	a	set	of	objectives	[…]	and	to	sustain	the	costs	of	those	actions	over	time”	(Brinkerhoff	2010:	1).	By	using	this	term,	DFID	articulates	the	‘problem’	as	one	of	commitment	rather	than	a	disagreement	over	what	the	objectives	should	be.	Thus,	instead	of	acknowledging	what	might	be	a	political	conflict	between	DFID’s	priorities	and	the	GOSS’	priorities,	this	is	represented	as	a	development	problem	that	can	be	solved	by	building	capacity	and	‘political	will’.	In	this	way,	the	policy	paper	uses	the	technique	of	‘rendering	technical’	(Li	2007:	7),	by	which	it	frames	the	problem	in	development	terms	in	order	to	represent	it	as	a	technical	problem	that	can	be	solved	by	development	projects.	The	GOSS’	inability	to	deal	with	problems	on	their	own	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	DFID’s	solution	to	the	problem,	namely	development	projects	funded	by	the	UK.	
The	plan	implicitly	defines	South	Sudan	as	a	fragile	state,	when	saying	“We	aim	to	follow	best	practice	aid	effectiveness	principles	for	working	in	fragile	states”	and	explicitly	states	that	it	will	support	the	process	of	statebuilding	(DFID	2011a:	2–3).	However,	statebuilding	is	represented	as	secondary	to	poverty	alleviation,	as	illustrated	by	this	paragraph:	“DFID	will	focus	on	helping	South	Sudan	develop	in	ways	which	allow	poor	people	[…]	to	benefit.	Given	the	nascent	nature	of	the	South	Sudanese	state,	DFID	will	additionally	support	the	country’s	processes	of	state	building”	(DFID	2011a:	3,	my	emphasis).	This	is	also	illustrated	by	the	list	of	expected	results,	where	only	two	out	of	eight	indicators	are	related	to	governance	(DFID	2011a:	4).	Thus,	there	is	a	tension	within	the	policy	paper	between	the	need	for	statebuilding,	which	is	a	long-term	process	that	might	not	generate	immediate	results,	and	socio-economic	development,	which	can	create	immediate	effects	for	poor	people.	The	plan’s	prioritization	could	be	a	result	of	the	fact	that	it	builds	on	an	overall	aid	review	published	in	2011,	which	states	that	British	aid	should	be	more	focused	on	helping	the	poorest	people	in	the	world	(DFID	2011a:	1,	2011b:	2).	Consequently,	DFID’s	priorities	for	development	in	South	Sudan	are	not	only	governed	by	what	is	needed	in	South	Sudan,	but	also	by	the	political	priorities	of	the	British	government.	
In	short,	DFID’s	Operational	Plan	problematizes	South	Sudan	as	a	state	that	is	‘underdeveloped’	compared	to	the	modern	state	and	that	needs	international	support	in	the	form	of	development	projects	if	it	is	to	tackle	this	‘problem’.	Even	though	DFID	argues	that	the	South	Sudanese	state	starts	from	scratch,	statebuilding	is	not	given	priority	and	the	policy	paper	does	not	explicitly	define	South	Sudan	as	a	fragile	state.	
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USAID: a focus on ownership and stability The	American	donor	agency,	USAID,	usually	works	with	five-year	Country	Development	Cooperation	Strategies	for	the	countries	they	are	involved	in.	However,	in	cases	of	conflict-affected	and	fragile	states,	USAID	designs	a	shorter-term	Transition	Strategy	for	the	country	(USAID	2012).	After	independence	in	2011,	USAID	chose	to	make	a	Transition	Strategy	for	South	Sudan	due	to	the	“high	degree	of	uncertainty”	about	the	level	of	instability	that	would	characterize	South	Sudan	(USAID	2011:	15).	The	‘South	Sudan	Transition	Strategy	2011-13’	describes	USAID’s	overall	goal	for	the	period,	which	is	“An	increasingly	stable	South	Sudan	post-CPA”,	and	it	describes	the	four	development	objectives	that	USAID	will	prioritize	(USAID	2011:	20).	These	are	1)	“Conflicts	in	Flashpoint	Areas	Mitigated”,	2)	“Effective,	Inclusive,	and	Accountable	Governance	Strengthened”,	3)	“Essential	Services	[…]	Developed	and	Sustained”	and	4)	“Agricultural-Based	Economic	Opportunities	Expanded”	(USAID	2011:	21).	
Similar	to	DFID’s	Operation	Plan,	the	Transition	Strategy	points	to	a	number	of	areas	where	South	Sudan	is	challenged	and	where	intervention	is	needed.	These	include	conflict	and	instability,	poverty,	food	insecurity,	water	and	sanitation,	health	care,	education,	infrastructure,	natural	resource	management,	agricultural	production	and	the	security	sector	(USAID	2011).	As	such,	USAID	confirms	the	representation	of	the	problem	as	serious	‘underdevelopment’,	with	South	Sudan	lacking	in	all	areas	of	what	the	modern	state	is	expected	to	deliver.	The	strategy	also	confirms	the	presupposition	that	the	GOSS	need	international	support	to	meet	its	challenges,	for	example	stating	“The	GOSS,	by	its	own	admission,	struggles	to	confront	these	challenges”	(USAID	2011:	7).	Again,	this	representation	is	necessary	for	the	solution	that	USAID	prescribes,	in	this	case	development	projects	funded	by	the	U.S.	
On	the	other	hand	though,	the	Transition	Strategy	stresses	that	local	‘ownership’	is	important	for	development	efforts	to	succeed.	It	states	that	USAID	will	“assist	the	government	and	the	people	of	South	Sudan	to	enhance	stability	and	advance	their	development	aspirations”	(USAID	2011:	7).	The	priorities	of	the	GOSS	are	taken	seriously	and	not	constructed	as	part	of	the	development	problem.	This	might	be	related	to	the	fact	that	the	U.S.	had	been	heavily	involved	in	statebuilding	in	South	Sudan	in	the	period	between	2005	and	2011	(USAID	2011:	11).	This	involvement	could	have	allowed	them	to	influence	what	the	GOSS’	priorities	were	in	2011,	thereby	enabling	USAID	to	support	local	‘ownership’	while	retaining	control	over	what	should	be	prioritized.	The	above	quote	also	illustrates	that	enhancing	stability	is	prioritized	above	South	Sudan’s	own	development	priorities.	It	is	unclear	who	is	expected	to	benefit	mostly	from	this	stability,	but	it	is	assumed	that	the	U.S.	and	South	Sudan	have	a	common	interest	in	enhancing	stability.	Thereby,	it	is	left	unproblematic	that	U.S.	interests	in	stabilizing	the	region	should	steer	the	development	efforts	of	USAID.	
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As	can	be	seen	from	the	overall	goal	of	the	strategy,	the	most	important	problem	to	be	dealt	with	is	the	risk	of	renewed	conflict	in	South	Sudan.	According	to	USAID,	this	is	closely	linked	to	‘underdevelopment’:	“For	South	Sudan,	the	risk	of	relapse	is	especially	high	as	the	widespread	perceptions	of	marginalization	that	brought	the	region	to	war	persist,	fed	by	severe	poverty,	food	insecurity,	weak	governance,	and	lack	of	infrastructure,	services,	and	economic	opportunities”	(USAID	2011:	7).	The	strategy	presupposes	that	the	lack	of	effective,	inclusive,	transparent	and	accountable	government	is	an	important	driver	for	conflict.	By	using	these	development	terms,	which	imply	that	South	Sudan	is	lacking	and	should	have	all	the	features	of	a	modern	state,	the	strategy	overlooks	the	way	that	fragile	alliances	between	different	political	actors	are	actually	held	together.	The	patronage	system,	which	allowed	political	actors	to	secure	enrichment	of	themselves,	their	family,	tribe	and	political	allies,	was	crucial	to	maintaining	the	political	cohesiveness	of	the	SPLA/M,	and	thus	keeping	the	government	in	place	without	contestation	from	rebel	groups2	(Waal	2014:	39).	However,	in	the	strategy	such	practices	are	described	as	‘corruption’,	and	the	fact	that	they	are	to	be	eliminated	remains	unproblematic.	Thus,	this	way	of	representing	the	problem	runs	the	risk	of	leading	to	a	situation	where	USAID	works	to	undermine	the	current	political	system	in	South	Sudan,	but	is	not	able	to	build	an	effective,	inclusive,	transparent	and	accountable	state	at	the	same	pace.	By	targeting	the	patronage	system,	USAID	would	be	undermining	the	political	settlement	and	thereby	also	their	own	goal	of	stability	in	the	country.	
Yet	even	though	South	Sudan	is	described	as	lacking	all	the	features	of	modern	statehood	and	being	on	the	brink	of	renewed	conflict,	the	Transition	Strategy	never	explicitly	defines	South	Sudan	as	a	fragile	state.	Instead	it	says:	“the	governance	institutions	and	systems	established	in	keeping	with	the	requirements	of	the	CPA	remain	extremely	fragile”	(USAID	2011:	33).	This	reflects	the	fact	that	the	‘fragile	state’	concept	is	viewed	as	a	very	political	term,	which	means	that	some	development	organizations	are	reluctant	to	label	a	specific	state	as	a	‘fragile	state’,	because	this	might	be	received	as	offensive	(Practitioner	H	2016:	203–204).	The	term	statebuilding,	which	also	implies	that	the	state	is,	if	not	fragile,	then	at	least	not	functioning	optimally,	can	suffer	from	the	same	problems.	Statebuilding	is	a	central	goal	in	the	strategy,	as	reflected	by	one	of	the	four	development	objectives:	“Effective,	Inclusive,	and	Accountable	Governance	Strengthened”	(USAID	2011:	21).	Yet	it	is	not	called	statebuilding,	but	framed	in	a	development	language,	which	uses	terms	such	as	‘building	capacity’	and	‘strengthening	institutions’	(USAID	2011:	33–35).	This	example	illustrates	the	difficulty	of	incorporating	statebuilding	initiatives,	which	are	essentially	political,	in	a	development	strategy	that	builds	on	principles	of	political	neutrality.	
																																								 																					2	This	only	lasted	until	a	lack	of	oil	revenues	in	2013	caused	the	system	to	collapse.	
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In	conclusion,	USAID’s	Transition	Strategy	reiterates	DFID’s	problematization	of	South	Sudan	as	a	case	of	‘underdevelopment’	and	as	a	country	that	needs	international	support	to	develop.	The	strategy	puts	more	focus	on	the	risk	of	renewed	conflict	than	DFID’s	plan	and	stability	is	presented	as	USAID’s	overall	goal	for	South	Sudan.	With	the	focus	on	ownership,	USAID	acknowledges	the	GOSS’	priorities	as	part	of	the	solution	and	not	part	of	the	problem	as	in	DFID’s	Operational	Plan.	The	Transition	Strategy	is	even	more	politically	sensitive	than	DFID’s	plan	in	that	it	does	not	explicitly	mention	neither	statebuilding	nor	fragile	states.	
Norway: statebuilding as an overt priority In	2009	the	Norwegian	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	ordered	a	review	of	the	entire	Norwegian	engagement	in	Sudan.	The	review	looks	at	Norway’s	engagement	so	far	and	makes	recommendations	for	the	future	engagement,	taking	into	account	the	upcoming	referendum	and	the	likely	secession	of	South	Sudan	(Utenriksdepartementet	2013).	Thus,	the	‘Sudan	Review’	differs	from	the	two	policy	papers	previously	analyzed	in	that	it	was	written	before	South	Sudan	gained	independence	and	further	that	it	was	not	published	by	the	Norwegian	donor	agency	(Norad),	but	by	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.	Yet	it	still	sets	out	the	strategy	for	Norway’s	engagement	in	South	Sudan	(and	Sudan)	after	July	2011	and	Norad	did	contribute	to	the	process	of	writing	the	review,	and	therefore	it	is	relevant	for	the	purposes	of	this	analysis	(Utenriksdepartementet	2013).	
The	Sudan	Review	lists	Norway’s	three	main	priorities	for	development	in	South	Sudan	as	“statebuilding,	service	delivery	with	a	focus	on	education,	as	well	as	natural	resource	management	and	economic	development”	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010:	3,	my	translation).	Compared	to	the	policy	papers	from	the	U.S.	and	the	UK,	Norway	puts	greater	emphasis	on	the	statebuilding	dimension	and	is	more	explicit	about	it.	Here,	statebuilding	is	mentioned	first	and	given	priority,	whereas	DFID	clearly	puts	statebuilding	as	a	secondary	task	and	USAID	cloaks	their	statebuilding	goals	in	development	terms.	The	Sudan	Review	explains	its	priorities	with	the	“extensive	challenges	concerning	governance	and	corruption”	in	South	Sudan	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010:	3,	my	translation).	It	is	also	clear	from	the	wording	of	the	policy	paper	that	the	task	of	statebuilding	is	understood	as	one	demanding	international,	and	particularly	Norwegian,	support.	It	states	that	in	case	of	South	Sudanese	independence	“statebuilding	in	the	south	will	be	a	demanding	task,	where	Norway	is	expected	to	have	a	strong	engagement”	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010:	4,	my	translation).	
In	addition	to	the	challenges	with	governance	and	corruption,	the	review	also	points	to	a	number	of	challenges	in	other	areas.	These	include	conflict,	natural	resource	management,	human	rights,	infrastructure	and	economic	development	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010).	In	describing	these	
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challenges	the	policy	paper	contributes	to	the	representation	of	the	problem	as	‘underdevelopment’,	which	was	also	made	in	the	British	and	American	policy	papers.	But	the	Norwegian	policy	paper	goes	further	and	explicitly	states	that	the	problem	in	South	Sudan	is	‘underdevelopment’,	when	it	states	“South	Sudan	is	one	of	the	least	developed	regions	in	the	world”	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010:	4).	Again,	the	Sudan	Review	describes	the	challenges	of	South	Sudan	in	a	very	direct	manner	without	using	a	lot	of	development	language.	This	could	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	this	policy	paper	is	authored	by	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	not	the	Norwegian	donor	agency.	A	ministry	has	a	political	mandate,	which	enables	them	to	say	things	that	are	more	politically	controversial	than	what	would	be	viewed	as	appropriate	for	a	donor	agency.	
It	is	noteworthy	how	much	emphasis	is	put	on	natural	resource	management	in	the	Sudan	Review;	it	is	listed	as	one	of	three	priority	areas.	The	review	states	that	“Natural	resource	management	will	be	an	important	challenge”	(Utenriksdepartementet	2010:	5).	As	Norway	is	an	oil-producing	country,	oil	revenue	management	is	an	area	where	they	have	specific	competence.	According	to	Corneliussen	from	Norad,	Norway	had	a	strong	political	interest	in	being	involved	in	developing	the	oil	revenue	management	system	in	South	Sudan	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	138–156).	Thus,	the	review	is	representing	the	‘problem’	according	to	the	solution	that	Norway	wants	to	prescribe,	namely	an	‘Oil	for	Development’	project.	
All	in	all,	the	Norwegian	Sudan	Review	also	reiterates	the	problematization	of	South	Sudan	as	a	case	of	‘underdevelopment’.	However,	it	is	much	more	direct	in	its	wording	and	does	not	cover	its	priorities	in	a	veil	of	development	language.	Also,	the	review	puts	greater	emphasis	on	statebuilding	and	natural	resource	management	than	the	policy	papers	from	the	UK	and	the	U.S.	
Effects of the problematization of South Sudan What	becomes	clear	in	the	above	analyses	is	that	the	troika	countries	all	problematize	South	Sudan	as	an	underdeveloped	country	that	needs	international	development	projects,	because	the	government	is	unable	and/or	unwilling	to	solve	the	country’s	many	problems	on	their	own.	The	analysis	has	already	touched	upon	some	of	the	consequences	of	this	problematization,	but	the	discussion	in	this	section	will	elaborate	on	the	effects	that	are	produced	by	the	troika’s	representation	of	the	problem	in	South	Sudan	(that	is,	question	5	of	the	WPR	approach).	
The	first	effect	that	emerges	from	all	three	of	the	policy	papers	is	that	the	representation	of	South	Sudan	as	a	development	task	allows	for	the	solution	that	the	donor	agencies	can	prescribe.	The	need	for	development	projects	in	the	world	justifies	the	existence	of	DFID,	USAID	and	Norad,	and	therefore	
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they	will	have	an	interest	in	maintaining	this	need.	Thus,	it	appears	that	the	development	organizations	have	engaged	in	the	process	that	Li	calls	‘rendering	technical’,	whereby	they	translate	a	political	problem	into	a	technical	one	in	order	to	establish	it	as	a	problem	that	can	be	solved	by	the	technical	solutions	that	development	organizations	can	offer	(Li	2007:	7–10).	
The	representation	of	the	problem	as	‘underdevelopment’	is	underpinned	by	a	Weberian	notion	of	statehood,	which	implies	that	certain	features	and	functions	ought	to	characterize	a	modern	state.	Furthermore,	the	term	‘underdevelopment’	invokes	associations	to	both	modernization	theory	and	dependency	theory.	Despite	their	many	differences,	both	of	these	theories	regard	development	as	a	structural	or	systemic	process,	and	as	such	one	that	cannot	be	hindered	or	facilitated	by	scattered,	small-scale	development	projects.	As	such,	using	this	term	to	describe	the	problem	to	be	solved,	DFID,	USAID	and	the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	represent	South	Sudan	as	a	problem	that	requires	not	just	some	development	projects,	but	large-scale,	all-encompassing	development	efforts.	One	might	doubt	whether	this	is	really	what	they	have	undertaken	in	South	Sudan,	but	at	least	this	problem	representation	ensures	that	no	amount	of	aid	can	be	considered	too	large	to	solve	the	problem	of	creating	development	in	South	Sudan.	In	this	way,	the	problem	representation	makes	it	possible	for	the	donor	agencies	to	invest	large	sums	of	money.	Thus,	it	is	only	logical	that	they	will	represent	South	Sudan	as	a	large	development	task,	and	this	point	should	not	be	taken	to	mean	that	such	a	need	does	not	exist,	only	that	it	could	have	been	represented	differently.	
Another	effect	of	the	problem	representation	is	that	the	troika	fails	to	take	the	South	Sudanese	‘reality’,	as	it	is	understood	by	practitioners	who	have	worked	on	the	ground	in	South	Sudan,	into	account.	Even	though	each	policy	paper	has	a	section	on	context,	these	sections	are	laden	with	western	assumptions	about	what	the	state	should	be	and	with	development	terms,	which	can	be	applied	to	most	developing	countries.	A	few	examples	of	these	terms	are	‘corruption’,	‘poverty’	and	‘human	rights’	(DFID	2011a;	USAID	2011).	As	I	have	described	above,	by	using	these	terms	to	describe	the	‘problem’	the	policy	papers	overlook	the	positive	aspects	of	the	patronage	system	(which	is	called	corruption)	and	the	way	that	security	sector	salaries	function	as	a	welfare	system	(this	is	called	a	bloated	security	sector).	
The	political	system	in	South	Sudan	works	through	informal	systems	that	are	very	different	from	the	formal	systems	that	govern	modern,	western	states.	It	seems	that	the	troika	countries	are	confined	by	their	own	point	of	departure,	which	means	that	they	are	unable	to	see	the	‘reality’	that	they	will	have	to	work	in	when	they	engage	in	South	Sudan.	Obviously,	this	will	hamper	the	effectiveness	of	aid	and	it	is	also	in	contrast	to	the	policies	of	the	donor	agencies.	In	a	policy	paper	on	fragile	states,	DFID	argues	that	it	will	employ	a	“drivers	of	change”	approach,	which	includes	“the	need	to	understand	the	history	
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of	a	country	and	its	people,	who	holds	power	and	how	it	is	brokered	and	used,	the	informal	‘rules	of	the	game’	[…],	and	the	relationship	between	these	and	formal	institutions”	(DFID	2005:	14).	Likewise,	USAID	has	stated	that	they	will	seek	“priorities	reflecting	the	realities	of	fragile	states”	in	their	fragile	states	strategy	(USAID	2005:	3).	Nevertheless,	they	fail	to	do	exactly	this	when	setting	out	the	strategies	for	their	engagement	in	South	Sudan.	
The	fact	that	South	Sudan	is	problematized	as	a	development	task	also	leads	to	some	difficulty	in	incorporating	statebuilding	goals	in	the	policy	papers.	Norway	and	the	UK	are	quite	clear	about	their	statebuilding	goals,	whereas	the	U.S.	is	more	cautious	with	the	use	of	this	term.	And	none	of	them	write	directly	that	South	Sudan	is	a	fragile	state.	This	finding	is	quite	surprising	given	the	predominance	of	the	fragile	states	agenda	in	the	development	community	and	the	fact	that	South	Sudan	seems	to	fit	well	into	the	fragile	states	category,	as	argued	above.	As	mentioned,	this	is	probably	due	to	the	fact	that	the	terms	‘fragile	state’	and	‘statebuilding’	are	more	politically	sensitive	than	most	development	terms.	As	Cornwall	argues,	development	language	is	characterized	by	feel-good	terms	with	a	vague	and	evasive	meaning,	which	are	effective	in	gathering	broad	support	for	development	work	(Cornwall	2010:	2–5).	In	this	field,	the	terms	‘statebuilding’	and	‘fragile	state’	stand	out	because	they	imply	a	critique	of	the	government	of	the	state	in	question	and	thereby	lose	some	of	their	‘feel-goodness’.	Development	organizations	have	long	tried	to	keep	politics	at	an	arm’s	length,	arguing	that	aid	had	to	be	politically	neutral	if	they	were	to	have	productive	relationships	with	governments	in	the	developing	countries	(Carothers	and	Gramont	2013:	3–4).	Even	though	development	organizations	have	begun	to	acknowledge	that	understanding	the	political	context	in	a	country	is	essential	if	development	aid	is	to	be	effective,	the	old	divide	between	aid	and	politics	is	still	widespread	(Carothers	and	Gramont	2013).	Therefore,	statebuilding,	which	is	inherently	political,	does	not	blend	in	easily	with	other	development	priorities.	This	tension	between	traditional	development	aid	and	statebuilding	underlies	all	of	the	three	policy	papers	and	this	has	the	effect	that	statebuilding	is	taking	in	on	development	terms.	
In	terms	of	prioritization,	Norway	puts	statebuilding	fairly	high	on	the	agenda	(one	out	of	three	main	goals),	the	U.S.	has	it	as	one	of	its	four	development	objectives,	and	the	UK	puts	statebuilding	as	a	secondary	task.	Thus,	the	lack	of	government	autonomy,	authority,	capacity	and	legitimacy	is	represented	as	one	problem	out	of	several	development	problems,	and	not	as	the	overall	problem.	This	is	even	though	there	was	a	widespread	understanding	among	donors	that	the	South	Sudanese	state	was	starting	from	scratch,	and	thus	that	statebuilding	was	needed	(Practitioner	G	2016:	47–50;	Interview,	Rolandsen	2016:	289–291).	Furthermore,	the	troika	countries	have	also	emphasized	the	importance	of	fragile	states	and	statebuilding	in	the	years	leading	up	to	South	Sudanese	independence.	
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The	U.S.	has	stated	that	“the	promotion	of	sustainable,	responsible,	and	effective	security	and	governance	in	fragile	states”	is	“a	central	national	security	objective”	(U.S.	Department	of	State	and	USAID	2010:	123).	DFID	has	presented	an	approach	that	“puts	state-building	and	peace-building	at	the	centre	of	our	work	in	fragile	and	conflict-affected	countries”	(DFID	2010a:	6).	Thus,	there	is	a	discrepancy	between	the	donors’	stated	commitment	to	support	fragile	states	and	do	statebuilding	work	and	the	priority	that	this	is	given	in	the	policy	papers	regarding	South	Sudan.	Instead	of	putting	statebuilding	work	at	the	heart	of	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	it	becomes	an	add-on,	meaning	another	priority	that	needs	to	be	fitted	into	the	development	portfolios.	
Conclusion This	analysis	of	three	key	policy	papers	from	the	UK,	the	U.S.	and	Norway	shows	that	South	Sudan	is	problematized	first	and	foremost	as	a	classic	case	of	‘underdevelopment’,	because	this	problem	representation	allows	for	the	solution	that	the	donor	agencies	want	to	prescribe,	namely	development	projects.	In	fact,	even	though	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	gained	a	lot	of	attention	within	the	development	community,	none	of	the	policy	papers	uses	the	term	‘fragile	state’	to	problematize	South	Sudan.	Further,	the	troika	countries	do	not	prioritize	statebuilding	as	highly	as	one	would	expect	given	their	stated	commitment	to	doing	statebuilding	work	in	general.	DFID	and	USAID	phrase	their	problematizations	in	a	development	language,	which	means	that	they	become	vague	and	ambiguous	enough	to	be	non-controversial	and	effective	in	gathering	political	support.	However,	this	also	means	that	the	policy	papers’	descriptions	of	the	challenges	and	possible	solutions	for	South	Sudan	are	altogether	out	of	touch	with	the	local	‘reality’.	It	will	be	interesting	to	see	whether	they	carry	these	issues	with	them	in	their	practical	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	which	is	the	object	of	study	in	the	following	chapter.	 	
	 39	
5. The practices of development organizations in South 
Sudan 
After	the	CPA	had	been	signed	and	Sudan	was	slowly	emerging	from	decades	of	war,	development	organizations	were	eager	to	begin	work	to	support	the	process	towards	a	stable	and	prosperous	Sudan.	Many	new	development	projects	were	initiated	in	the	southern	part	of	Sudan,	which	would	continue	after	South	Sudan	gained	independence	in	2011.	This	chapter	will	investigate	what	development	organizations	have	actually	done	in	South	Sudan,	with	a	focus	on	development	projects	with	a	statebuilding	dimension.	In	doing	this,	the	analysis	will	examine	the	governance	practices	that	development	organizations	have	engaged	in	and	explore	what	the	goals	of	these	governance	practices	were.	The	present	chapter	will	provide	an	answer	to	the	second	sub-question:	What	characterizes	the	practices	of	international	development	organizations	in	their	development	work,	focusing	on	statebuilding,	in	South	Sudan?	
The	first	two	sections	of	this	chapter	will	map	out	the	overall	trends	in	development	aid	to	South	Sudan.	The	third	section	will	present	three	statebuilding	projects	that	will	be	used	as	examples	in	the	analysis,	and	the	rest	of	this	chapter	will	provide	an	analysis	of	the	governance	practices	that	have	characterized	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	using	the	analytical	framework	from	Chapter	3	and	focusing	on	the	last	three	dimensions	of	the	regime	of	practices:	episteme,	techne	and	identity	formation.	
Overview of aid to South Sudan Following	the	signing	of	the	CPA	in	2005,	there	was	a	large	influx	of	aid	to	the	southern	part	of	Sudan.	Figure	1	(below)	illustrates	the	inflow	of	aid	to	South	Sudan	after	independence	compared	to	previous	years’	aid	flows	to	the	whole	of	Sudan.	The	OECD	data	on	aid	to	Sudan	during	the	period	from	2005	to	2011	is	not	disaggregated	by	region,	and	therefore	it	is	difficult	to	discern	how	much	of	the	aid	went	to	the	southern	part	of	the	country.	When	looking	at	these	numbers,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Sudan’s	area	after	2011	is	still	roughly	three	times	as	large	as	South	Sudan’s.	
The	international	society,	and	especially	the	troika	states	that	had	been	engaged	in	making	the	peace	agreement	a	reality,	were	pleased	to	see	the	civil	war	come	to	an	end.	They	assumed	that	southern	Sudan	was	now	in	a	post-conflict	situation,	where	the	need	for	emergency	and	humanitarian	aid	was	diminishing	and	long-term	development	work	could	be	undertaken	(Bennett	et	al.	2010:	82).	The	majority	of	development	aid	(79%	in	the	years	2005-2009)	went	to	projects	that	focused	on	
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socioeconomic	development,	including	providing	basic	services,	livelihood	support,	physical	reconstruction	and	reintegration	of	displaced	people	(Bennett	et	al.	2010:	63,	79).	The	fact	that	the	international	society	had	committed	to	‘making	unity	attractive’	during	the	interim	period	meant	that	they	could	not	assume	that	South	Sudan	would	become	independent,	and	therefore	they	were	restrained	in	their	ability	to	undertake	core	statebuilding	work	in	the	south	(Interview,	Rolandsen	2016:	282–287).	However,	especially	the	U.S.	did	support	institution	building	during	this	period,	and	after	2011	many	donors	started	working	more	intensely	with	statebuilding.	The	amount	of	aid	to	South	Sudan	was	not	immediately	raised	following	independence,	but	rather	there	was	a	gradual	increase.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	donors	had	already	been	tempered	in	their	enthusiasm	about	what	could	be	achieved	in	South	Sudan,	because	the	large	amount	of	aid	granted	after	the	CPA	had	not	given	the	expected	results	(Practitioner	H	2016:	404).	
Figure	2	(below)	illustrates	the	distribution	of	money	to	humanitarian	aid	and	development	aid	respectively.	Humanitarian	aid	is	defined	as	aid	that	is	given	with	the	goal	being	to	“save	lives,	alleviate	suffering	and	maintain	and	protect	human	dignity	during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	emergencies”	(Walmsley	2010).	Development	aid	is	all	other	aid	and	it	usually	focuses	on	longer-term	goals.	The	figure	shows	that	even	during	the	relatively	peaceful	years	2012-2013,	roughly	half	of	all	aid	to	South	Sudan	was	humanitarian.	This	is	a	very	high	share	when	compared	to	other	developing	countries.	Given	that	statebuilding	work	is	only	one	area	among	many	within	the	category	of	development	aid,	
		(Source:	OECD	2016)	
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this	leads	to	a	question	of	whether	donors	actually	prioritized	statebuilding	work,	or	long-term	development	work	at	all.		
Donor landscape The	donor	landscape	in	South	Sudan	after	2011	was	dominated	by	the	same	donors,	which	had	been	engaged	in	Sudan	for	decades,	among	these	the	three	troika	countries.	In	2011,	a	total	of	13	bilateral	donors	and	8	multilateral	organizations	were	giving	aid	to	South	Sudan	(Larson	et	al.	2013:	3).	Figure	3	(below)	shows	that	the	troika	countries	were	still	the	three	largest	single-country	donors	after	South	Sudanese	independence.	The	EU	was	also	a	big	donor,	as	well	as	Canada	and	Japan.	
All	of	the	three	troika	countries	have	a	long	history	of	engagement	with	Sudan,	and	later	South	Sudan.	They	have	invested	vast	amounts	of	humanitarian	and	development	aid	in	the	two	countries	and	they	have	invested	political	and	diplomatic	resources	in	reaching	a	solution	to	the	civil	war.	Through	this	work,	organizations	and	individuals	from	the	troika	countries	have	gained	experience	and	knowledge	of	Sudan	and	South	Sudan.	For	instance,	the	UK	is	the	former	colonial	master	in	Sudan,	and	their	common	history	go	back	to	the	19th	century	(Massoud	2013).	Norway	also	has	historical	ties	to	Sudan,	albeit	not	going	back	as	long	as	the	UK’s.	In	the	1960’s	university	exchange	programs	connected	the	two	countries	and	Norway	has	long	been	a	donor	of	aid	to	Sudan	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	636–646).	Especially	two	Norwegian	NGO’s	have	a	long	history	of	engagement	in	Sudan:	Norwegian	Church	Aid	
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and	Norwegian	People’s	Aid.		Meanwhile,	Norway	has	also	become	one	of	the	leading	countries	for	research	and	knowledge	about	Sudan	(Kelleher	2006:	291).	
The	last	troika	country,	the	U.S.,	has	been	one	of	the	major	donors	of	aid	to	Sudan	for	the	past	few	decades,	while	also	being	one	of	the	leading	states	in	getting	the	OLS	up	and	running.	Politically,	the	relationship	between	Sudan	and	the	U.S.	has	been	strained	ever	since	the	military	coup	that	brought	President	Bashir	to	power	in	1989	(Dagne	2012).	Following	concerns	that	the	Sudanese	government	was	sponsoring	terrorism,	the	U.S.	imposed	sanctions	on	the	regime	in	1997	(Attree	2012:	12).	At	the	same	time,	the	U.S.	presidents	Bush	and	Obama	as	well	as	the	U.S.	Congress	were	highly	engaged	in	seeking	a	peaceful	resolution	of	the	civil	war	(Dagne	2012:	64–66;	Rolandsen	2011:	554).	The	following	section	will	present	some	examples	of	the	specific	development	projects	that	the	troika	countries	have	funded	in	collaboration	with	other	members	of	the	international	society.	
Examples of statebuilding projects This	section	will	give	a	short	presentation	of	some	of	the	statebuilding	projects	that	have	been	undertaken	in	South	Sudan.	In	addition	to	illustrating	what	kind	of	concrete	work	that	has	been	done	
Canada	5%	
United	States	33%	
EU	Institutions	8%	Japan	5%	
United	Kingdom	15%	
Norway	6%	
Others	28%	
Figure	3:	Aid	to	South	Sudan	by	donor	2011-2014	
(Source:	OECD	2016)	
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in	order	to	support	statebuilding	in	South	Sudan,	these	projects	will	be	used	as	examples	of	the	issues	that	are	covered	in	the	following	sections	of	this	chapter.	
DFID’s	Safety	and	Access	to	Justice	Programme	in	South	Sudan	(SAJP)	arose	from	a	program	that	had	covered	the	whole	of	Sudan	before	2011,	and	which	was	split	in	two	when	South	Sudan	gained	independence.	The	program	was	primarily	concerned	with	training	of	police	officers	and	building	police	stations	and	a	police	academy,	and	it	did	not,	despite	the	name,	have	an	access	to	justice	dimension.	The	program	was	primarily	funded	by	the	UK	(£9,681,939),	but	the	Netherlands	(£4,374,148)	also	made	contributions	to	the	project,	especially	to	the	building	of	the	Rambour	Academy	for	training	of	police	officers	(DFID	2015).	The	program	ran	from	March	2011	until	November	2014	and	was	implemented	by	private	service	providers,	specifically	a	consortium	led	by	ATOS	Consulting	and	by	the	International	Procurement	Agency	(IPA).	
The	UN	Disarmament,	Demobilisation	and	Reintegration	Program	(DDR)	was	originally	envisioned	to	demobilize	90,000	combatants.	In	the	CPA	the	parties	had	committed	to	demobilizing	and	reintegrating	a	proportion	of	their	forces,	and	this	provided	the	starting	point	for	the	DDR	program	in	South	Sudan.	Yet	after	the	peace	agreement,	the	SPLA	showed	little	interest	in	demobilizing	their	combatants	and	the	program	only	truly	began	in	2009	(Munive	2013).	The	first	phase	of	the	program	was	undertaken	in	collaboration	between	UNMIS,	UNDP	and	the	South	Sudan	Disarmament,	Demobilisation,	and	Reintegration	Commission.	It	ran	until	2012	and	it	only	succeeded	in	demobilizing	12,525	people,	many	of	whom	were	not	actual	combatants.	This	phase	was	funded	by	Japan,	the	UK,	Canada,	Norway,	Spain,	Sweden,	the	Peace	Building	Fund,	Italy	and	the	Netherlands	(in	descending	order	from	largest	to	smallest	contribution)	(Bhattacharjee	and	Gadkarim	2012:	14).	A	second	phase	was	planned	to	start	in	2012,	but	was	delayed.	The	World	Bank	took	over	the	program	and	started	doing	pilot	projects	in	2013	(Expert	B	2016).	
Norway’s	Oil	for	Development	Program	was	initiated	in	2006	to	support	the	management	of	oil	resources	both	in	Sudan	and	South	Sudan	(Norad	2011:	78).	In	South	Sudan	the	program	has	supported	the	development	of	laws	for	the	petroleum	sector,	developed	the	capacity	of	the	Ministry	of	Petroleum	Mining	and	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	trained	engineers,	supported	the	creating	of	the	national	petroleum	company	and	attempted	to	address	environmental	issues	related	to	petroleum	mining	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	36–46;	Norad	2011:	78).	The	program	is	implemented	by	the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	and	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	along	with	other	official	agencies,	the	Norwegian	People’s	Aid,	Global	Watch	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	(Norad	2015).	
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These	three	statebuilding	projects	cover	a	variety	of	different	ways	of	doing	development	and	statebuilding	work.	They	have	different	aims,	are	over	time	funded	by	different	constellations	of	donors,	and	are	implemented	by	different	kinds	of	organizations.	Therefore,	they	enable	the	analysis	to	draw	on	examples	that	represent	many	of	the	different	ways	that	statebuilding	work	has	been	undertaken	in	South	Sudan.	The	following	three	sections	will	draw	on	these	three	examples	of	statebuilding	projects	as	they	examine	the	governance	practices	that	development	organizations	have	used	in	their	work	in	South	Sudan	and	thereby	explore	the	various	ways	problematizations	have	been	put	into	concrete	practice.	
Development rationality: clashes between different realities From	the	analysis	in	Chapter	4	we	learned	that	the	troika	countries	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	case	of	‘underdevelopment’,	meaning	that	the	South	Sudanese	society	is	at	a	different	stage	in	their	development	trajectory	than	the	western	states	where	many	development	organizations	have	their	headquarters.	Given	this	understanding	of	developing	countries,	development	organizations	often	emphasize	that	“Approaches	must	be	carefully	adapted	to	suit	local	context”	(Downie	2011:	24).	However,	in	Chapter	4	the	analysis	concluded	that	donor	agencies	managed	to	overlook	important	aspects	of	the	South	Sudanese	‘reality’	in	their	policy	papers.	This	section	will	explore	whether	and	how	this	issue	played	out	when	development	organizations	planned	and	implemented	specific	development	projects	in	South	Sudan.	
When	development	organizations	engaged	in	capacity	building	and	other	activities,	which	sought	to	strengthen	the	state	institutions	in	South	Sudan,	they	often	assumed	that	South	Sudan	was	a	clean	slate,	where	they	could	help	build	a	state	that	did	not	have	the	same	problems	as	many	other	developing	countries.	For	example,	Biddle	describes	the	aim	of	the	SAJP	program,	which	was	presented	above,	as	“trying	to	develop	and	train	a	police	force	from	scratch”	(Interview,	Biddle	2015:	73).	The	GOSS	also	contributed	to	this	understanding,	as	they	were	keen	to	get	the	donors	to	invest	large	sums	of	money.	Sørbø	spoke	about	a	meeting	with	some	ministers	from	the	GOSS,	where	they	“only	talked	about	that	they	needed	everything.	You	know	we	start	from	scratch,	everything	is	important”	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	33–34).	By	mistakenly	conflating	the	facts	that	South	Sudan	was	a	newly	independent	state	with	the	idea	that	it	was	also	a	new	society,	development	organizations	seem	to	have	underestimated	the	importance	of	South	Sudan’s	historical	legacy.	For	instance,	development	organizations	failed	to	take	the	institutional	legacy	from	Sudan	into	account,	which	largely	influenced	the	new	state:	
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“when	the	South	Sudanese	were	building	or	developing	their	state	in	South	Sudan,	they	were	inadvertently	imitating	the	political	and	administrative	practices	of	the	Sudanese	state	[…]	because	that	was	the	system	that	they	knew.	And	those	that	came	back	to	South	Sudan	after	many	years	in	Khartoum	where	they	had	been	living	and	working	within	that	system”	(Interview,	Rolandsen	2016:	298–302).	
Not	taking	this	into	account	meant	that	donors	were	not	expecting	the	level	of	blatant	corruption	that	emerged	in	South	Sudan	and	which	led	South	Sudan	to	be	ranked	as	one	of	the	most	corrupt	countries	in	the	world	(171	out	of	175)	in	the	2014	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(The	Sentry	2015:	3).	Instead	the	donors	held	on	to	a	“naive	view	of	South	Sudan,	that	everything	bad	came	from	Khartoum,	[…]	that	they	were	the	good	guys	and	the	bad	guys	were	in	the	north”	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	43–44).	As	such,	this	example	suggests	that	development	organizations’	understanding	of	the	local	‘reality’	may	have	been	insufficient	to	enable	their	projects	to	be	realistic.	
Another	illustration	of	development	projects	being	unrealistic	and	out	of	touch	with	the	local	‘reality’	is	the	fact	that	several	projects	focused	on	supporting	the	drafting	and	enactment	of	new	laws.	The	Oil	for	Development	Program,	which	was	presented	above,	has	succeeded	in	having	two	laws	regarding	the	petroleum	sector	passed,	and	another	project	has	promoted	the	development	of	laws	to	protect	the	freedoms	of	people	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	43–45;	Practitioner	G	2016:	39–40).	This	focus	builds	on	development	organizations’	experiences	in	western	states,	where	passing	a	new	law	will	normally	lead	to	a	change	in	practice.	However	the	South	Sudanese	society	is	not	to	the	same	degree	governed	by	laws.	As	expressed	by	a	World	Bank	representative,	there	is	a	“lack	of	modern	legal	systems	in	the	South	Sudanese	culture”	(Larson	et	al.	2013:	22).	A	good	example	of	this	is	the	practices	of	the	police	in	Torit,	who	“were	using,	I	think	it	was	Kenyan	traffic	law,	because	they	hadn't	got	access	to	their	own	law”	(Practitioner	F	2015:	59–60).	The	consequence	is	that	donors’	focus	on	the	development	of	law	could	in	reality	be	pointless,	except	for	the	fact	that	having	a	law	pass	is	a	nice,	tangible	output	of	a	development	project,	which	will	enable	the	donor	to	classify	the	project	as	successful.	
It	seems	odd	that	the	development	organizations	were	not	better	prepared	and	did	not	have	the	knowledge	that	would	have	enabled	them	to	foresee	these	problems.	Many	of	them	had	been	working	in	the	southern	part	of	Sudan	for	years	previous	to	South	Sudanese	independence	and	were	familiar	with	the	country’s	history.	An	alternative	explanation	could	be	that	the	issue	was	not	with	the	level	of	knowledge	of	the	local	‘reality’,	but	the	way	knowledge	was	used	by	the	development	organizations.	This	passage	from	a	2012	review	of	the	SAJP	program	is	illustrative	of	the	way	that	the	local	‘reality’	is	
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represented	in	development	work.	The	context	in	which	the	police	reform	program	operated	was	described	as	follows:	
“The	SSNPS	[South	Sudan	National	Police	Service]	was	virtually	starting	from	scratch	following	the	Comprehensive	Peace	agreement	(CPA)	with	just	a	very	small	number	of	personnel	who	were	trained	as	police	officers	(estimated	as	between	5	to	15%).	In	the	period	following	the	CPA	the	organisation	became	a	dumping	ground	for	soldiers	affiliated	to	the	army	and	Other	Armed	Groups	(OAGs)	who	the	government	needed	to	‘civilianise’	but	keep	on	the	public	payroll.	[…]	The	majority	of	the	personnel	within	the	SSNPS	had	been	trained	to	kill,	either	as	members	of	the	SLPA	or	as	members	of	different	militia”	(DFID	2012).	
This	quote	shows	that	DFID	does	have	some	knowledge	of	how	the	local	‘reality’	works,	as	they	are	clearly	not	describing	the	South	Sudanese	police	force	in	the	same	manner	that	they	would	describe	the	British	police	for	instance.	But	it	also	appears	that	this	understanding	is	written	into	a	linear	development	narrative	that	does	not	leave	much	room	for	nuances	and	contradictions,	in	line	with	Li’s	argument	that	development	practitioners	translate	‘messy	conjunctures’	into	linear	narratives	(Li	2007:	4).	The	review	states	that	very	few	police	officers	have	been	trained,	however	it	leaves	out	the	fact	that	the	training	some	of	them	had	received	in	Khartoum	was	actually	of	a	very	good	quality	compared	to	African	standards	(Interview,	Biddle	2015:	75–84).	It	also	mentions	that	many	police	officers	were	former	soldiers	from	different	militias,	however	this	is	constructed	as	a	problem	and	it	omits	the	potential	positive	consequences	of	this,	since	it	ensures	that	the	police	force	includes	a	diversity	of	different	ethnic	and	political	groups.	
In	order	to	create	a	linear	narrative,	important	nuances	are	excluded,	thereby	leaving	project	staff	with	a	skewed	understanding	of	the	context	they	are	working	in.	It	appears	that	the	function	of	presenting	this	knowledge	about	the	South	Sudanese	police	force	is	not	to	enlighten	the	reader,	or	to	give	them	a	full	account	of	the	local	‘reality’.	Instead,	knowledge	seems	to	be	employed	with	the	aim	of	enabling	the	development	organization	to	govern.	In	order	to	legitimize	the	spending	of	millions	of	pounds	on	the	SAJP	program,	DFID	represents	the	local	‘reality’	as	only	constituting	problems,	whereas	the	solution	is	that	which	the	SAJP	program	will	provide.	
Another	example	of	how	the	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	use	knowledge	to	construct	linear	development	narratives	comes	from	the	Oil	for	Development	program.	In	the	program	document,	the	objective	of	the	program	is	described	as	follows:	
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“The	ambition	of	the	programme	is	to	contribute	to	the	further	development	and	strengthening	of	a	governance	system	for	the	petroleum	sector	in	South	Sudan	that	fosters	efficiency,	transparency,	anticorruption	and	which	is	in	compliance	with	the	principles	of	Good	Governance.	A	governance	system	based	upon	a	national	petroleum	policy,	improved	petroleum	legislation,	regulations	and	model	contracts	will	facilitate	the	work	of	the	institutions	in	the	sector	to	create	a	level	and	competitive	playing	field	for	the	industry	and	protect	the	national	interests	with	due	considerations	to	health,	safety	and	environmental	issues”	(Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	2012:	8).	
Here,	the	narrative	is	clearly	based	on	the	model	of	problem-intervention-beneficial	result	(Li	2007:	4).	The	problem	is	described	as	an	inadequate	“governance	system	for	the	petroleum	sector”,	the	intervention	is	the	creation	of	“a	national	petroleum	policy,	improved	petroleum	legislation,	regulations	and	model	contracts”	and	the	beneficial	result	is	a	“competitive	playing	field”	and	the	protection	of	“national	interests”	(Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	2012:	8).	As	such	it	is	argued	that	the	changes	in	formal	law	and	policy	that	the	program	promotes	will	lead	to	substantial	changes	for	the	petroleum	industry,	thereby	legitimizing	the	spending	of	development	funds	on	this	project.	However,	in	reality	this	change	has	not	yet	manifested	itself.	According	to	Corneliussen,	in	the	case	of	the	petroleum	laws,	“the	implementation	is	still	pending”	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	46).	I	take	this	to	mean	that	the	law	has	not	yet	changed	practices,	suggesting	that	the	orderly	narrative	of	the	program	document	did	not	match	with	the	local	‘reality’.	
The	two	examples	above	show	how	DFID	and	Norway’s	Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	appear	to	be	using	knowledge	to	create	linear	development	narratives	in	order	to	legitimize	their	projects.	These	representations	fulfill	the	development	organizations’	need	for	order,	in	line	with	Berg	and	Ufford’s	view	that	development	organizations	are	addicted	to	promises	of	order	(Berg	and	Ufford	2005:	203).	The	project	documents	imply	an	expectation	that	governance	will	be	effective,	in	other	words	that	the	intentions	with	the	programs	will	match	the	outcomes.	Such	an	expectation	seems	to	be	an	essential	part	of	the	development	organizations’	rationality,	as	they	must	assure	the	donors	of	aid	that	their	money	will	not	be	spent	in	vain.	
The	calculative	rationality	of	governmentality,	which	entails	that	you	define	a	goal,	prioritize	targets	and	chose	the	strategy	that	you	think	will	yield	the	best	result,	is	premised	on	a	notion	of	order	that	enables	you	to	make	such	a	calculation	(Li	2007:	6).	This	is	why	USAID	for	example	lists	seven	assumptions	about	the	future	of	South	Sudan	in	their	Transition	Strategy	and	Norway’s	Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	list	three	prerequisites	for	the	Oil	for	Development	program	to	work	in	South	Sudan	(Ministry	of	Petroleum	and	Energy	2012:	8;	USAID	2011:	14).	Even	though	they	have	no	
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certainty	that	these	assumptions	will	hold,	they	need	them	in	order	to	employ	a	calculative	rationality,	arguing	that	their	plan	for	development	in	South	Sudan	will	be	successful.	Consequently,	translating	knowledge	into	a	linear,	orderly	narrative	was	necessary	for	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	in	order	to	plan	and	legitimize	their	projects.	As	we	have	seen	these	practices	in	play	in	relation	to	several	development	projects	in	South	Sudan,	it	is	possible	to	argue	that	they	are	characteristic	of	the	‘episteme’	of	the	development	regime	of	practices.	
However,	in	line	with	Berg	and	Ufford’s	observation	that	development	has	been	“shielded	from	a	serious	confrontation	with	the	real	world”	(2005:	203),	one	could	argue	that	the	prevalence	of	order	had	the	unfortunate	consequence	that	many	development	projects	in	South	Sudan	were	completely	out	of	touch	with	the	local	‘reality’.	In	the	modern,	western	countries	where	development	organizations	are	usually	based,	it	might	be	feasible	to	plan	and	implement	policies	according	to	the	calculative	rationality,	but	in	highly	volatile	situations	where	the	context	changes	rapidly	this	seems	to	be	a	rather	ineffective	type	of	governance.	Even	though	development	organizations	attempted	to	take	the	local	‘reality’	into	account,	the	development	regime	of	practices	hindered	their	ability	to	do	this.	When	projects	were	not	well	suited	to	the	local	‘reality’,	it	nonetheless	made	it	more	difficult	for	the	development	organizations	to	achieve	one	of	the	goals	of	their	work,	namely	development	in	South	Sudan.	In	the	end	this	meant	that	both	donors	and	the	population	of	South	Sudan	became	disappointed	with	the	impact	of	development	projects.	
Goal of governance: development or institutional survival? In	the	previous	section,	it	was	concluded	that	the	development	rationality	made	it	difficult	to	create	actual	developmental	change	in	South	Sudan.	So	far	we	have	not	questioned	the	fact	that	development	was	actually	the	goal	of	development	organizations’	work.	However	according	to	the	analytical	considerations	of	Mosse	(2005a:	103–104)	development	organizations	are	also	pursuing	‘system	goals’,	which	are	defined	as	goals	that	serve	the	self-interest	of	an	organization.	This	section	will	look	closer	at	which	goals	underlay	development	organizations’	governance	in	South	Sudan	and	whether	‘system	goals’	were	prioritized	over	development	goals.	Three	distinct	governance	techniques	that	promote	‘system	goals’	are	identified:	ensuring	that	funding	is	spent	according	to	budget;	establishing	development	projects	as	successful;	and	favoring	action	over	inaction.	These	techniques	will	be	addressed	one	by	one	in	the	following.	
Firstly,	the	technique	of	ensuring	that	funding	is	spent	according	to	budget	is	seen	in	the	way	that	development	organizations	let	control	of	funds	take	precedence	over	having	a	coordinated	approach	to	development	in	South	Sudan.	In	the	period	right	after	the	CPA	there	was	a	strong	focus	on	
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coordination	among	donors	(Bennett	et	al.	2010:	131).	Harmonization	was	one	of	the	central	principles	of	the	Paris	Declaration,	which	was	signed	in	2005,	and	this	arguably	had	an	influence	on	donor	priorities	at	the	time.	The	focus	on	coordination	led	to	the	creation	of	a	variety	of	pooled	funding	mechanisms,	the	goals	of	which	were	to	improve	coordination	and	lessen	the	strain	on	the	GOSS	in	relation	to	donor	requirements.	
However,	some	of	these	funds,	and	especially	the	Multi-donor	Trust	Fund	had	severe	efficiency	problems,	which	caused	long	delays	in	the	disbursement	of	funds	to	projects.	The	World	Bank,	which	managed	the	Multi-donor	Trust	Fund,	had	no	experience	with	working	in	Sudan	and	their	rigid	procedures	for	procurement	were	completely	unsuited	for	the	local	context	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	325–334).	Even	though	only	19%	of	donor’s	funding	went	through	pooled	funds,	the	problems	with	the	Multi-donor	Trust	Fund	and	other	funds	caused	donors’	enthusiasm	for	coordination	and	collaboration	to	shrink.	Eventually	this	led	to	a	rollback	to	bilateral	aid	after	2011	(Bennett	et	al.	2010:	58;	Interview,	Rolandsen	2016:	207–209).	
The	difficulty	in	coordinating	aid	to	South	Sudan	stems	from	the	fact	that	control	over	project	budgets	and	spending	is	extremely	important,	as	development	organizations	are	held	responsible	for	the	spending	of	taxpayers’	money	according	to	plan.	If	it	is	revealed	that	development	funds	were	misused	then	the	consequence	may	be	that	a	specific	development	organization	is	not	trusted	by	the	donor	with	executing	development	projects	again	or	it	may	even	incite	a	sentiment	in	favor	of	cuts	in	aid	budgets.	As	such,	I	will	suggest	one	can	assume	that	ensuring	money	is	spent	according	to	budget	is	a	‘system	goal’	for	the	development	organizations,	since	it	is	vital	to	their	institutional	survival.	
When	donors	put	their	money	into	pooled	funds	like	the	Multi-donor	Trust	Fund	they	are	essentially	giving	up	their	ability	to	control	spending	and	thereby	also	partly	their	ability	to	secure	their	own	institutional	survival.	Therefore,	even	though	many	donors	appreciated	the	benefits	of	coordination,	they	were	hesitant	to	leave	the	World	Bank	or	anyone	else	in	control	of	the	spending	of	their	money.	As	one	interviewee	put	it:	“no	one	was	ready	to	let	go	of	the	[control],	everyone	wanted	to	have	the	hand	on	the	steering	wheel	for	their	own	money”	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	342–343).	And	when	it	became	clear	that	the	World	Bank	were	not	managing	the	disbursement	of	the	funds	channeled	through	the	Multi-donor	Trust	Fund	very	effectively,	this	only	further	impeded	development	organizations’	willingness	to	coordinate.	If	we	take	as	a	premise	that	coordination	does	secure	more	effective	development	work,	as	most	development	organizations	acknowledge,	then	choosing	to	spend	the	majority	of	aid	on	bilateral	development	projects	suggests	that	development	organizations	prioritized	‘system	goals’	over	development	goals.	
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Secondly,	in	addition	to	demonstrating	that	they	can	manage	funds	responsibly,	development	organizations	also	need	to	demonstrate	that	they	can	conduct	successful	development	projects.	This	is	necessary	in	order	to	legitimize	the	continuous	channeling	of	development	funds	through	the	organization	in	question.	No	donor	agency	can	justify	spending	money	on	a	development	project	if	they	cannot	contend	that	they	have	a	good	amount	of	certainty	that	the	project	will	be	productive.	This	is	done	through	a	careful	process	of	planning,	implementation	and	evaluation,	which	is	called	a	program	cycle	(Practitioner	G	2016:	95).	Usually	the	success	of	a	project	is	defined	as	the	achievement	of	the	outputs	and	outcomes	stated	in	the	Logframe.	For	the	SAJP	program,	the	Logframe	lists	four	specific	outputs,	which	are	composed	of	several	output	indicators,	as	the	example	below	shows.	
“OUTPUT	1	 Output	Indicator	1.1	Assist	development	of	an	enabling	environment	through	support	to	improving	capacity	for	strategic	management	and	leadership	training	and	development	
SSNPS	Change	Management	process	established	Output	Indicator	1.2	Change	Management	Unit	completes	development	of	5	key	policies	as	per	the	annual	Policing	Plan	[…]	Output	Indicator	1.3	National	State	Training	Unit	established	at	Rajav	Police	College,	operational	and	working	to	agreed	Action	Plan	and	SSNPS	State	Training	Units	at	5	SAJP	focal	sites	established,	operational	and	working	to	agreed	Action	Plan	[…]”	(Source:	DFID	2010b:	A42–B56)	
The	output	stated	in	this	example	might	be	described	as	quite	vague	and	intangible.	An	‘enabling	environment’	is	not	something	that	you	can	intuitively	point	out	or	describe.	On	the	other	hand,	the	output	indicators	are	very	specific	and	tangible,	listing	for	example	the	completion	of	‘5	key	policies’	as	an	indicator,	as	well	as	the	establishment	of	a	‘National	State	Training	Unit’	at	a	specific	place.	These	features	are,	if	not	something	you	can	physically	see,	at	least	something	where	you	would	quite	easily	be	able	to	ascertain	if	it	existed.	
The	design	of	the	Logframe	in	this	way	indicates	that	it	was	important	for	the	SAJP	program	to	have	measurable	outputs,	such	as	the	‘5	key	policies’	completed,	even	though	one	might	argue	that	this	number	says	nothing	about	the	content	and	quality	of	the	policies	or	the	degree	to	which	they	govern	practices	on	the	ground.	This	need	to	have	measurable	goals	for	outputs	of	a	project	reflects	the	
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development	organizations’	focus	on	evaluation,	as	highly	tangible	output	indicators	make	it	easy	to	establish	whether	a	project	has	reached	its	goal,	in	line	with	Berg	and	Ufford’s	(2005:	200)	argument	on	development	organizations’	preference	for	quantitative	data.	Evaluations	are	then	used	to	determine	whether	a	project	should	continue,	be	scaled	up	or	be	closed	down.	In	this	regard,	these	measurable	goals	function	as	a	technique	of	governance	that	development	organizations	employ	in	order	to	be	able	to	assert	that	their	projects	are	performing	well.	As	argued	above,	being	able	to	demonstrate	that	development	projects	are	successful	is	necessary	for	the	institutional	survival	of	development	organizations	and	accordingly,	the	goals	pursued	here	appears	to	be	the	organizations’	‘system	goals’.	
However,	this	practice	can	have	some	negative	consequences	when	the	‘reality’	on	the	ground	does	not	match	with	the	assumptions	that	the	measurable	outputs	are	based	on.	For	the	output	in	the	table	above,	two	of	the	assumptions	listed	are	“SSNPS	budgets	increased	where	necessary	to	support	changes	introduced”	and	“Compliance	and	support	of	national	agreed	policy	and	standards	by	partners”	(DFID	2010b).	Given	the	local	‘reality’,	where	the	state	budget	almost	exclusively	goes	to	the	payment	of	army	salaries,	and	where	the	adoption	of	formal	policy	does	not	necessarily	led	to	changes	in	practice,	as	described	above,	these	assumptions	seem	highly	optimistic.	If	the	assumptions	do	not	hold	then	the	output	indicators	may	not	lead	to	the	expected	change.	
One	practitioner	explains	the	challenges	that	this	practice	causes	for	the	project	staff:	
“you	are	aiming	towards	the	end	goal,	[…]	but	your	progress	is	going	to	be	fast	in	some	places,	slow	in	other	places,	you	go	backwards	in	some	places,	but	ultimately	you	will	move	towards	that	goal.	So	the	pure,	clinical	assessment	and	measurement	of	progress	on	the	project	does	not	reflect	day-to-day	life.	It's	as	simple	as	that.	And	that	is	a	frustration	for	any	project	manager,	because	we	can	be	particularly	good	at	making	a	project	look	good,	I	mean	we've	assessed	projects	ourselves	in	the	past	and	we	know	what	people	look	for”	(Practitioner	F	2015:	220–226).	
Accordingly,	if	the	project	staff	is	idealistic	and	genuinely	wants	to	create	development,	they	have	to	work	towards	two	different	goals:	giving	the	impression	that	the	project	is	achieving	the	measurable	outputs	and	at	the	same	time	adjusting	the	project	so	that	it	will	promote	developmental	change.	Thus,	whether	the	project	manages	to	promote	development	on	the	ground	is	largely	dependent	on	the	skills	of	the	project	staff	in	navigating	between	these	two	logics.	The	Logframe	and	the	program	cycle	in	general	seem	to	be	designed	to	promote	‘system	goals’	over	development	goals,	and	as	development	
	 52	
organizations	applied	these	to	their	projects	in	South	Sudan,	one	could	understand	this	as	another	indicator	that	they	prioritized	‘system	goals’	over	development	goals.	
Finally,	the	last	technique	that	development	organizations	use	in	order	to	pursue	their	‘system	goals’	is	to	favor	action	over	inaction.	Such	a	technique	may	seem	counterproductive	to	the	aim	of	demonstrating	successful	projects,	but	it	is	supported	by	their	ability	to	disclaim	responsibility	if	a	project	should	fail.	In	line	with	their	stated	goal	of	promoting	development,	development	organizations	rely	on	principles	to	ensure	that	they	only	undertake	development	projects	that	are	realistic,	appropriate	and	not	least	have	local	‘ownership’.	As	one	practitioner	explained,	it	is	important	to	have	“buy-in	of	stakeholders	so	that	[…]	we	never	impose	a	program”	(Practitioner	G	2016:	177–178).	These	principles	vary	slightly	from	organization	to	organization.	DFID	focuses	on	their	projects	providing	value	for	money,	as	well	as	relying	on	evidence-based	assumptions	about	best	practices.	Corneliussen	described	Norway’s	criteria:	“we	have	to	from	our	side	at	least	look	at	it	and	see	okay	is	this	relevant,	is	it	realistic,	is	it	sustainable,	you	know	all	sort	of	criteria	that	we	usually	use”	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	282–284).	Officially	the	function	of	these	criteria	is	to	ensure	that	development	organizations	only	initiate	projects	that	will	result	in	real	development	on	the	ground.	Yet,	applying	these	criteria	can	also	be	seen	as	a	technique	of	governance,	as	it	could	legitimize	the	choice	of	some	development	projects	instead	of	others.	
Due	to	their	long-term	engagement	in	Sudan	and	their	commitment	to	the	peace	process,	there	was	a	certain	pressure	on	the	troika	countries	to	continue	to	be	involved	and	provide	aid	to	South	Sudan	after	independence,	in	order	to	not	have	the	progress	already	made	be	lost	due	to	a	collapse	of	the	new	state	(Practitioner	H	2016:	384–386).	Moreover,	donors	needed	to	preserve	South	Sudan	as	a	success	story	if	they	wanted	to	avoid	losing	face	in	case	the	independence	of	South	Sudan	would	come	to	be	seen	as	a	mistake.	Both	in	the	U.S.	and	in	Norway	there	are	local	interest	groups	who	lobby	for	continued	support	to	South	Sudan,	so	that	adds	increased	pressure	on	the	governments	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	612–630).	This	leads	to	a	situation	where	“it's	hard	to	not	do	something”	(Practitioner	G	2016:	165).	In	other	words,	it	was	in	the	interests	of	donor	agencies	to	respond	in	some	way	to	the	development	‘problems’	in	South	Sudan.	
In	the	case	of	the	DDR	program,	one	of	the	examples	of	statebuilding	projects	presented	above,	the	problem	to	be	solved	was	that	it	was	unsustainable	for	the	state	to	keep	paying	salaries	to	a	large	army	of	around	300.000	soldiers.	However,	at	the	time	the	SPLA	had	no	intention	of	actually	downsizing	the	army,	and	as	such	the	DDR	program	completely	lacked	local	ownership	(Practitioner	H	2016:	116–119).	Even	though	donors	were	probably	aware	that	making	a	successful	DDR	program	under	these	circumstances	would	be	extremely	difficult,	donors	felt	they	had	to	do	something	about	the	problem	
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(Expert	C	2015:	234–235).		It	appears	that	they	feared	the	political	consequences	that	could	emerge	if	they	did	nothing,	war	broke	out	again,	and	they	could	be	accused	of	contributing	to	this	through	their	inaction.	As	an	evaluation	of	the	program	concludes:	“The	programme	has	been	so	far	driven	by	the	political	necessity	of	being	seen	to	be	delivering	according	a	seven-year	old	agreement	[CPA]”	(Bhattacharjee	and	Gadkarim	2012:	33).	Thus,	the	donor	agencies	funded	a	program	that	was	neither	realistic	nor	had	local	ownership.	The	DDR	program	has	since	been	widely	judged	as	a	failure,	because	it	failed	to	reach	its	target	number	of	combatants	demobilized	and	reintegrated,	and	those	who	were	demobilized	and	reintegrated	were	largely	non-essentials	(elderly	or	disabled	soldiers)	or	proxies	(relatives	of	ex-combatants).	Further,	the	DDR	program	also	failed	to	trigger	a	downsizing	of	the	army,	as	new	soldiers	were	enrolled	in	order	to	prepare	for	a	potential	war	with	Sudan	(Munive	2013:	14).	This	example	seems	to	indicate	that	bypassing	the	criteria	for	development	projects	does	not	lead	to	developmental	change	on	the	ground.	
What	we	can	take	from	this	example	is	that	the	donor	agencies	were	able	and	willing	to	bend	their	own	criteria	for	initiating	programs,	when	these	were	in	conflict	with	other	interests.	The	criteria,	which	were	supposed	to	ensure	that	the	goal	of	development	in	South	Sudan	could	actually	be	reached	through	the	development	projects	undertaken,	instead	became	a	technique	for	legitimizing	the	choices	made.	In	undertaking	the	DDR	program,	one	could	argue	that	the	donors	prioritized	their	‘system	goals’	above	the	goal	of	development	in	South	Sudan.	Even	when	the	DDR	program	failed	to	deliver	the	expected	results,	at	least	the	donors	could	say	that	they	had	tried	to	fix	the	problem,	and	a	lack	of	‘political	will’	from	the	GOSS	was	to	blame	for	the	failure.	Therefore	the	option	of	initiating	a	DDR	program	even	when	the	chances	for	success	seemed	slim,	appeared	to	be	a	more	appealing	option	than	doing	nothing.	
The	above	analysis	has	painted	a	picture	of	development	organizations	that	repeatedly	prioritize	their	own	institutional	survival	over	the	goal	of	creating	development	in	South	Sudan.	They	do	this	through	three	different	governance	techniques:	ensuring	that	funding	is	spent	according	to	budget,	establishing	development	projects	as	successful	and	favoring	action	over	inaction.	As	such,	it	appears	that	these	techniques	are	characteristic	of	the	‘techne’	of	the	regime	of	practices.	However,	this	should	not	be	taken	to	mean	that	development	is	not	also	a	goal,	but	rather	that	it	is	not	the	only	one.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	the	way	development	organizations	represent	their	own	identity	as	one	that	is	characterized	by	benevolent	intentions	and	the	pursuit	of	goals	that	serve	‘the	greater	good’	of	development,	in	line	with	Li’s	definition	of	the	‘trustee’	identity	(Li	2007:	4–5).	This	identity	renders	development	organizations	almost	immune	to	criticism,	which	may	be	problematic	because	it	obscures	the	fact	that	some	of	their	practices	are	hindering	the	effectiveness	of	development	work.	
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Development organizations’ limited space for action In	the	above	sections,	the	conclusions	drawn	were	that	development	organizations’	rationality	and	their	pursuit	of	‘system	goals’	impeded	the	developmental	change	that	projects	were	able	to	create.	However,	we	should	be	careful	in	not	assuming	that	if	development	organizations	had	not	engaged	in	these	practices,	then	they	would	have	been	successful	in	creating	development.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	development	organizations	operated	in	an	environment	where	multiple	actors	conducted	governance,	not	least	the	GOSS,	who	has	a	legitimate	mandate	to	govern	in	South	Sudan.	Forming	other	actors’	space	for	action	is	a	central	part	of	governmentality,	and	this	section	will	explore	how	the	development	organizations’	space	for	action	was	confined	by	other	actors.	
The	notion	of	development	organizations’	limited	space	for	action	can	shed	new	light	on	the	difficulty	of	taking	the	local	‘reality’	into	account.	Development	organizations	working	with	statebuilding	in	South	Sudan	have	largely	focused	on	capacity	building	in	the	ministries	and	other	public	institutions,	for	instance	sending	technical	advisors	to	support	and	train	public	servants	(Larson	et	al.	2013).	Especially	the	Ministry	of	Finance	was	prioritized	by	donors	and	received	a	large	amount	of	technical	advisors:	“I	remember	going	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	for	example,	and	you	would	see	[…]	that	there	were	maybe	15	people,	maybe	5	South	Sudanese	and	the	rest	different	international	[advisors]”	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	429–431).	Capacity	building	within	the	Ministry	of	Finance	was	also	a	part	of	the	Oil	for	Development	program,	as	mentioned	above.	
It	might	seem	logical	to	think	that	if	you	teach	civil	servants	in	the	Ministry	of	Finance	how	to	make	a	budget,	the	state	will	follow	this	budget.	But	development	organizations	wrongly	assumed	that	the	civil	servants	were	in	a	position	to	ensure	adherence	to	the	budget.	In	fact,	the	army	was	able	to	overrule	any	decision	made	in	the	state	bureaucracy	(Expert	B	2016:	85–86).	Development	organizations	failed	to	take	these	informal	systems	of	governance	into	account	when	planning	their	projects	and	therefore	overestimated	the	impact	that	strengthening	the	formal	institutions	would	have.	However,	as	the	following	quote	from	a	paper	on	capacity	building	in	South	Sudan	indicates,	they	were	not	oblivious	to	these	informal	systems	within	the	state:	
“One	donor	official	distinguished	between	the	“Real	Ministry	of	Finance”	and	the	“Fake	Ministry	of	Finance.”	The	“Fake	Ministry”	is	the	one	working	with	the	donors	and	technical	advisors	on	budget	allocations,	promoting	the	outward	appearance	of	high	functionality,	while	the	“Real	Ministry”	is	operated	through	backdoor	dealings	between	South	Sudanese	officials,	concealed	from	donor	view.	As	the	donor	official	says:	“The	
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technical	advisors	help	prepare	budget	allocations,	but	then	the	army	generals	wheel	into	the	minister’s	office,	and	they	make	the	real	allocations.””	(Larson	et	al.	2013:	21).		
Previously,	it	was	argued	that	such	a	failure	to	include	the	local	‘reality’	in	project	design,	even	when	development	organizations	had	knowledge	about	it,	was	due	to	the	need	to	construct	linear	development	narratives.	Yet,	there	might	be	another	factor	that	is	contributing	to	this	trend,	because	even	if	development	organizations	were	aware	of	the	limited	influence	of	the	formal	bureaucracy,	they	were	limited	in	their	ability	to	circumvent	this	problem.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	they	have	to	legitimize	their	actions	according	to	the	development	policies	of	their	government,	as	Mosse	has	argued	(2005a:	21).	As	such,	their	space	for	action	is	limited	by	their	constituency;	they	cannot	for	example	negotiate	budget	allocations	with	army	officers,	because	that	would	send	a	wrong	message	that	they	are	supporting	an	informal,	illegitimate	system	of	governance.	
It	appears	that	the	GOSS	has	been	skillful	in	using	this	weakness	of	development	organizations	to	their	own	advantage.	They	were	able	to	accept	development	projects	that	focused	on	capacity	building,	in	order	to	get	the	benefits	of	training,	equipment,	buildings	and	so	on,	while	not	allowing	the	procedures	imposed	by	these	projects	to	limit	their	ability	to	control	the	state’s	spending.	This	technique	of	governance	is	what	Pritchett	et	al.	(2010)	calls	‘isomorphic	mimicry’,	as	institutional	forms	are	changed,	but	function	does	not	follow.	This	example	illustrates	that	development	organizations	are	not	the	only	actors	who	‘seek	to	shape	the	conduct	of	others’,	that	is,	to	engage	in	governance	practices	(Dean	2010:	17–24).	The	GOSS	also	sought	to	govern,	and	sometimes	with	an	aim	that	was	contrary	to	that	of	development	organizations.	When	they	were	successful,	they	were	able	to	obstruct	the	change	that	development	projects	worked	to	create.	
Another	example	of	how	the	development	organizations’	space	for	action	was	limited	stems	from	an	incidence	in	which	the	GOSS	engaged	in	a	more	direct	form	of	governance	and	thus	broke	with	the	identity	formation	that	development	organizations	had	attempted	to	establish.	When	the	GOSS	was	established	following	the	CPA,	donors	were	optimistic	and	supportive	of	the	new	government.	This	was	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	some	people	saw	the	South	Sudanese	as	‘the	good	guys’,	as	mentioned	above.	After	independence,	and	in	line	with	the	focus	on	‘ownership’	within	the	development	community,	donors	were	keen	to	have	the	GOSS	formulate	their	own	aid	strategy,	which	they	managed	to	do	already	in	November	2011	(Ministry	of	Finance	and	Economic	Planning	2011).	However,	the	EU	and	other	countries’	donor	agencies	had	contributed	to	the	formulation	of	the	GOSS’	Aid	Strategy,	so	the	formulation	of	a	national	strategy	seemed	to	be	more	important	for	the	maintenance	of	the	ownership	agenda	than	for	actual	strategic	purposes	(EU	2011:	5).	This	practice	confirms	Whitfield’s	(2007:	147–148)	argument	that	the	ownership	agenda	is	reproducing	classic	donor/recipient	
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identities.	And	here	it	seems	that	both	parties	were	acting	in	accordance	with	what	was	expected	from	a	donor	and	a	recipient	identity.	
Still,	this	was	not	always	the	case.	When	donors	were	committing	funds	to	development	projects	they	would	often	demand	that	the	GOSS	invest	in	the	particular	sector	as	well:	“all	the	aid	in	South	Sudan	was	based	on	the	fact	that	South	Sudan	should	invest	themselves,	it	shouldn't	only	be	the	donors.	Because	they	had	oil,	the	income,	it	was	expected	that	they	would	do	a	significant	investment	as	part	of	the	deal”	(Practitioner	H	2016:	320–322).	However,	when	disagreements	with	the	Sudanese	government	over	transit	fees	led	the	GOSS	to	shut	down	oil	production	in	the	beginning	of	2012,	the	state’s	resources	quickly	dried	up	and	they	were	not	able	to	hold	up	their	part	of	the	deal.	Donors	were	highly	discontented	with	this	decision,	as	they	reckoned	it	jeopardized	the	whole	country’s	future	(Practitioner	H	2016:	327–329).	Larson	et	al.	summarize	donors’	reactions:	
“Leaked	memos	from	the	World	Bank	revealed	that	the	donors	predicted	South	Sudan	would	become	a	failed	state	within	six	months;	the	British	ambassador	to	South	Sudan	was	very	unhappy,	and	expressed	DFID’s	displeasure	with	“committing	British	taxpayer	money	when	GoSS	cannot	manage	their	own	finances.””	(Larson	et	al.	2013:	26).	
This	incident	severely	damaged	the	trust	between	donors	and	the	GOSS.	As	Li	(2007:	15)	points	out,	one	of	the	central	attributes	of	the	recipient	identity	is	that	the	government	follows	donors’	advice.	When	the	GOSS	decided	to	act	independently,	without	consulting	or	taking	advice	from	donors,	they	broke	with	the	recipient	identity	that	they	had	previously	taken	on.	Instead	at	this	point,	the	GOSS	chose	to	oppose	the	governance	practices	of	the	donors,	and	assume	the	identity	of	a	sovereign	state	that	could	manage	its	own	foreign	relations.	
In	attempting	to	form	South	Sudan’s	identity	as	a	recipient	identity,	one	that	would	take	advice	from	donors,	it	seems	that	development	organizations	were	trying	to	enable	their	own	governance	practices.	However,	the	GOSS	did	not	passively	adhere	to	these	practices.	Instead	they	engaged	in	both	subtle	and	overt	governance	practices	to	pursue	their	own	goals,	and	one	might	even	argue	that	they	were	quite	skillful	in	navigating	the	development	playing	field.	Furthermore,	the	GOSS	chose	to	adhere	to	a	recipient	identity	for	as	long	as	this	did	not	contradict	what	was	viewed	as	vital	national	interests,	allowing	them	to	gain	the	trust	and	confidence	of	development	organizations.	These	identity	formation	practices	appear	to	constitute	part	of	the	fourth	dimension	of	the	regime	of	practices.	Consequently,	the	governance	practices	of	the	GOSS	appear	to	have	significantly	limited	the	development	organizations’	space	for	action.	
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Conclusion From	this	analysis	of	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	it	seems	clear	that	the	work	of	the	international	society’s	development	organizations	do	share	some	similarities	and	organized	practices.	Therefore,	it	makes	sense	to	talk	of	a	development	regime	of	practices.	Development	organizations’	governance	rely	on	some	specific	practices	with	regard	to	the	way	knowledge	is	used,	the	techniques	employed	and	the	identities	shaped	by	these	practices.	However,	these	characteristics	of	the	regime	of	practices	often	seem	to	be	counterproductive	in	the	attempt	to	steer	South	Sudan	onto	a	productive	development	path.	This	seemingly	inefficiency	of	development	organizations	stems	from	three	factors.	First,	the	development	rationality	is	not	well	suited	to	the	‘reality’	that	development	organizations	were	working	in.	Their	preoccupation	with	creating	orderly	development	narratives	meant	that	knowledge	was	not	used	in	a	way	that	enabled	a	nuanced,	complete	understanding	of	the	local	‘reality’.	Secondly,	the	analysis	found	that	the	main	goal	of	development	organizations’	governance	was	in	fact	not	developmental	change	for	South	Sudan,	but	rather	institutional	survival	for	the	organizations	themselves.	This	is	obtained	through	ensuring	the	spending	of	development	funds	according	to	budget,	demonstrating	the	success	of	projects	and	prioritizing	action	over	inaction.	Thirdly,	development	organizations	did	not	operate	in	a	power	vacuum.	The	relations	of	power	between	the	GOSS	and	development	organizations	were	essential	in	shaping	development	organizations’	space	for	action.	 	
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6. Global governance through development 
From	the	analyses	in	the	two	previous	chapters	we	have	gained	an	understanding	of	the	development	practices	at	play	in	the	development	work	done	in	South	Sudan.	Similarities	between	these	practices	suggested	that	they	were	part	of	a	regime	of	practices,	and	as	such	it	is	also	conceivable	that	this	regime	of	practices	characterizes	development	work	outside	South	Sudan,	perhaps	even	globally.	Through	a	discussion	of	the	findings	from	the	previous	chapters	in	combination	with	academic	literature	and	statements	from	interviewees	who	spoke	about	development	work	generally,	this	chapter	will	explore	the	links	between	local	practices	and	global	processes	of	governance	through	development.	In	doing	so,	it	will	go	back	to	some	of	the	questions	posed	in	Chapter	1:	Why	is	it	that	“donor	illusions	about	the	advantages	of	having	a	good	plan	are	alive	and	well”	(Booth	2015:	14)?	Do	the	planning	and	implementation	practices	of	development	organizations	still	impede	the	international	society’s	ability	to	promote	development?	And	what	does	this	mean	for	their	ability	to	tackle	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states?	All	in	all,	the	discussion	will	seek	to	answer	the	third	sub-question:	How	do	the	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	fit	into	the	global	development	regime	of	practices	and	which	consequences	does	this	regime	of	practices	have	for	development	work	globally?	
This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections.	The	first	section	will	discuss	whether	the	practices	identified	in	the	study	of	South	Sudan	form	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices.	The	second	section	will	look	at	which	consequences	such	a	regime	of	practices	could	have	for	global	development	work	and	lastly,	I	will	discuss	how	this	might	affect	development	organizations’	ability	to	deal	with	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states.	
The global development regime of practices The	notion	of	a	‘development	regime	of	practices’	rests	on	the	assumption	that	the	practices	of	international	development	organizations	are	to	some	extent	organized,	in	the	same	manner	across	different	organizations.	This	section	will	discuss	three	of	the	main	findings	from	Chapter	5	in	relation	to	empirical	data	on	how	development	work	is	done	globally	in	order	to	explore	whether	and	how	these	practices	are	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices.	
First	of	all,	the	analysis	in	Chapter	5	found	that	the	calculative	rationality	of	development	organizations,	which	entails	that	they	define	a	goal,	prioritize	targets	and	choose	the	strategy	that	they	think	will	give	the	best	results,	was	leading	to	a	way	of	planning	development	projects	that	failed	to	take	the	South	Sudanese	context	into	account.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	this	rationality	is	premised	on	order,	while	the	‘reality’	in	South	Sudan	was	characterized	by	a	volatile	and	unpredictable	situation.	As	
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mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	this	pattern	of	development	organizations	using	planning	methods	that	are	inexpedient	in	the	given	context	has	been	identified	by	other	authors.	Recently,	Pritchett	et	al.	(2010)	have	argued	that	the	way	development	organizations	do	capacity	building	programs	has	led	to	persistent	implementation	failure.	They	argue	that	“’big	development’	encourages	progress	through	importing	standard	responses	to	predetermined	problems”	(Pritchett	et	al.	2010:	abstract).	This	observation	is	backed	by	Therkildsen,	who	argues	that	development	planning	methods	have	not	changed	drastically	since	he	voiced	his	criticism	of	the	control-oriented	planning	approach	in	the	1980’s	(Interview,	Therkildsen	2015:	185–189).	At	that	time,	his	study	of	rural	water	sector	development	in	Tanzania	led	him	to	conclude	that	“the	control-oriented	planning	and	implementation	approaches	used	so	far	by	donors	and	recipients	in	the	rural	water	sector	build	on	assumptions	and	lead	to	practices	which	are	not	appropriate	in	this	context”	(Therkildsen	1988:	201,	my	emphasis).	Accordingly,	the	findings	from	the	analysis	of	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	seem	to	overlap	with	some	of	the	general	characteristics	of	the	global	development	regime	of	practices.	
As	an	alternative	to	the	control-oriented	planning	practices,	Pritchett	et	al.	suggest	that	development	organizations	should	adopt	the	‘Problem	Driven	Iterative	Adaptation’	(PDIA)	approach,	which	includes	four	recommendations:	
“efforts	to	build	state	capability	should	(i)	aim	to	solve	particular	problems	in	local	contexts,	as	nominated	and	prioritized	by	local	actors,	(ii)	through	the	creation	of	an	“authorizing	environment”	for	decision-making	that	allows	“positive	deviation”	and	experimentation,	(iii)	involving	active,	ongoing,	and	experiential	learning	and	the	iterative	feedback	of	lessons	into	new	solutions,	and	(iv)	by	engaging	broad	sets	of	agents	to	ensure	that	reforms	are	viable	and	relevant—	i.e.,	are	politically	supportable	and	practically	implementable”	(Pritchett	et	al.	2013:	235).	
As	the	name	suggests,	the	PDIA	approach	is	based	on	the	idea	that	development	projects	should	be	continuously	adapted	to	fit	the	local	context,	thereby	also	implying	that	planning	projects	thoroughly	before	implementation	actually	begins	is	if	not	futile,	then	at	least	somewhat	ineffective.	The	approach	challenges	the	notion	that	the	broad	outline	of	the	way	development	will	take	place	in	a	given	context	is	knowable	in	advance	(Pritchett	et	al.	2010).	
At	first	glance	it	seems	conceivable	that	adopting	the	PDIA	approach	could	solve	some	of	the	problems	with	the	planning	practices	of	development	organizations.	For	instance,	if	the	PDIA	approach	had	been	meticulously	used	in	South	Sudan,	the	DDR	program	might	have	been	significantly	changed	or	halted	completely	once	the	ongoing	learning	process	had	revealed	that	it	was	neither	‘politically	supportable’	
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nor	‘practically	implementable’	(Expert	B	2016).	However,	Pritchett	et	al.	fail	to	consider	the	function	that	control-oriented	planning	practices	has	for	ensuring	the	‘system	goals’	of	development	organizations.	As	the	analysis	of	development	practices	in	South	Sudan	indicated,	development	organizations	need	to	have	elaborate	plans	for	their	projects	in	order	to	legitimize	spending	large	amounts	of	money	on	them.	As	one	interviewee	put	it,	“you	cannot	spend	16	billion	a	year	and	be	process[oriented]”	(Expert	C	2015:	524–525).	The	implicit	argument	here	is	that	it	is	not	politically	viable	for	development	organizations	to	follow	the	PDIA	approach	of	iterative	planning.	Therefore,	even	though	the	PDIA	approach	may	be	beneficial	for	reaching	development	goals,	development	organizations	are	constrained	in	their	ability	to	use	it,	because	it	could	jeopardize	their	institutional	survival.	This	might	be	the	explanation	for	why	a	critique	that	emerged	some	30	years	ago	continues	to	be	valid	today.	
Secondly,	the	previous	chapter	was	also	able	to	conclude	that	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	were	often	prioritizing	‘system	goals’	over	development	goals.	Some	of	the	practices	that	promoted	the	goal	of	institutional	survival	were	even	hindering	the	effectiveness	of	development	work.	This	observation	stands	in	contrast	to	the	image	that	development	organizations	promote	of	themselves.	As	one	interviewee	argued,	development	organizations	are	“designed	to	be	the	good	guys”	(Expert	C	2015:	93).	This	representation	of	the	development	identity	as	inherently	‘good’	and	‘altruistic’	seems	to	correspond	badly	to	the	finding	that	development	organizations	seek	goals	that	are	in	their	own	self-interest.	So	does	this	conclusion	mean	that	development	practitioners	are	in	fact	cynics	who	do	not	care	about	development	at	all?	
The	empirical	data	gathered	for	use	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	this	is	not	the	case.	Rather,	numerous	interviewees	pointed	out	that	there	are	many	development	practitioners	who	are	idealistic,	competent	and	who	try	to	make	a	difference	(Expert	E	2015:	135–136;	Practitioner	F	2015:	598–601;	Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	248).	This	emphasis	sometimes	came	as	an	objection	to	their	criticism	of	development	work	in	general,	for	instance	stating	“but	still	there	is	a	whole	lot	of	very,	very	competent,	very,	very	sympathetic	and	very,	very	benevolent	people”	(Expert	C	2015:	122–123).	This	way	of	articulating	it	suggests	that	idealistic	development	practitioners	are	constrained	in	their	work	by	the	ways	development	organizations	operate,	or	in	other	words,	by	what	we	analytically	can	denominate	the	development	regime	of	practices.	One	of	the	interviewees	who	had	experienced	this,	explained	it	in	this	way:	”So	you	are	navigating	a	field	that	you	actually	don’t	really	understand	[…]	Because	it	might	be	that	we	bring	some	good	ideas	and	some	good	intentions	[…]	but	then	you	are	of	course	a	part	of	a	bigger	structural	reality	regarding	interventions”	(Expert	E	2015:	134–137).	This	observation	is	also	underpinned	by	the	fact	that	development	practitioners	in	South	Sudan	had	to	navigate	between	two	
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different	logics	if	they	wanted	to	both	demonstrate	that	a	project	was	achieving	its	measurable	targets	(system	goal)	and	achieve	real	development	in	the	country	(development	goal),	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	5.	As	such,	it	seems	that	the	practice	of	prioritizing	‘system	goals’,	which	was	found	in	the	analysis	of	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	is	actually	part	of	the	global	development	regime	of	practice,	and	further	that	this	practice	inhibits	the	ability	of	competent	practitioners	to	create	developmental	change.	
Yet	it	is	also	worth	mentioning	that	development	practitioners	have	their	own	personal	‘system	goals’,	such	as	keeping	their	job	or	getting	promoted	and	one	could	argue	that	it	is	only	fair	that	they	should	pursue	these	goals	just	as	other	professionals	do.	However,	due	to	development	organizations’	focus	on	‘system	goals’,	it	seems	that	promotions	are	not	rewarded	to	those	who	create	development,	or	even	those	who	manage	successful	development	projects	(Expert	E	2015:	151–152).	Rather,	those	who	survive	in	the	development	world,	”they	just	do	what	they	are	asked	no	matter	whether	it	is	completely	preposterous	and	it	won’t	lead	to	any	results”	(Expert	E	2015:	177–178).	In	this	way,	it	seems	that	development	practitioners’	pursuit	of	their	own	personal	‘system	goals’	is	detrimental	to	the	pursuit	of	development	goals.	
These	observations	are	important,	because	the	actions	of	development	practitioners	are	ultimately	what	make	up	global	development	practices.	Given	the	different	perspectives	presented	here,	the	most	reasonable	conclusion	seems	to	be	that	development	practitioners	are	as	different	as	any	other	category	of	professionals.	Yet	what	is	troubling	is	that	it	appears	the	development	regime	of	practices	is	not	supporting	and	rewarding	practitioners	who	work	to	create	real	change	on	the	ground	in	developing	countries.	Instead,	they	need	practitioners	who	can	help	secure	the	institutional	survival	of	the	development	organizations.	Here,	one	might	argue	that	the	institutional	survival	of	development	organizations	is	necessary	for	development	work	to	be	carried	out	in	the	future	as	well,	and	therefore	that	promoting	‘system	goals’	somehow	equals	to	promoting	development.	However,	if	development	organizations	continue	to	de-emphasize	development	goals	in	the	future,	then	moving	forward	on	their	official	aims	of	promoting	development	through	projects	that	are	adapted	to	the	local	context	and	characterized	by	local	ownership	may	be	far	into	the	future.	
This	leads	me	to	the	third	finding	from	Chapter	5.	Here	it	emerged	that	development	organizations	had	a	limited	space	for	action	when	they	were	implementing	development	projects	in	South	Sudan,	because	the	GOSS	was	also	engaging	in	governance	practices	to	pursue	their	own	goals.	In	a	way	this	finding	should	not	be	surprising	since	development	organizations	were	operating	within	a	sovereign	state	with	a	(more	or	less)	functioning	government,	which	had	an	internationally	recognized	mandate	to	govern	the	country.	It	is	a	common	condition	for	development	work	that	the	recipient	government	
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needs	to	approve	the	development	projects	that	are	undertaken;	however	it	appears	that	often	recipient	governments	will	not	be	too	critical	in	this	process	as	they	want	to	secure	a	large	flow	of	aid	money	into	their	country.	As	one	interviewee	described	it,	“many	of	them	[recipients]	thought,	let’s	get	the	money,	as	soon	as	the	money	flows	then	we	will	have	much	more	leverage”	(Interview,	Therkildsen	2015:	279–280).	
This	reflects	the	fact	that	the	relations	of	power	between	donor	agencies	and	recipients	of	aid	change	once	a	development	projects	is	initiated.	Before	a	project	is	agreed	upon,	the	recipient	government	has	a	clear	interest	in	securing	the	aid	funds	that	the	donor	agency	is	willing	to	spend.	However,	after	a	project	is	initiated	the	donor	agency	has	a	strong	interest	in	spending	the	budgeted	funds,	in	order	to	legitimize	their	choice	to	allocate	this	amount	of	money	to	the	project.	At	this	point	the	recipient	government	is	in	a	better	position	to	negotiate	the	terms	of	the	project	(Interview,	Therkildsen	2015:	280–291).	This	can	lead	to	a	situation	that	resembles	what	Renzio	and	Hanlon	call	a	“pathological	equilibrium”	(2007:	6),	in	which	development	organizations	accept	a	certain	level	of	corruption	in	the	recipient	government	as	long	as	this	government	officially	adheres	to	the	conditions	for	aid.	These	practices	were	also	identified	in	South	Sudan	where	the	government	accepted	capacity	building	projects	that	sought	to	change	the	way	the	state	bureaucracy	worked	and	then	circumvented	these	changes	by	allowing	an	informal	system	to	work	parallel	to	the	formal	system	of	governance.	Again,	this	indicates	that	the	practices	of	development	organizations	in	South	Sudan	are	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices.	
So	if	these	are	relatively	common	occurrences	in	the	development	world	then	how	come	the	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	did	not	anticipate	that	they	would	be	limited	in	their	space	for	action	and	adapt	their	projects	to	this	‘reality’?	The	answer	might	be	found	in	the	view	of	development	that	is	predominant	among	development	organizations.	Pritchett	et	al.	argue	that	development	is	seen	by	most	people	as	“a	cumulative	historical	process”	(2010:	3),	thereby	as	something	that	can	occur	unintentionally	as	a	result	of	a	complexity	of	human	actions.	However,	among	development	organizations	this	view	is	sometimes	left	out	of	consideration	in	favor	of	the	view	of	development	as	something	that	can	be	done	intentionally.	The	notion	among	development	practitioners	is	that	“we	can	still	be	actors	that	do,	that	make	development”	(Expert	C	2015:	105).	One	might	argue	that	this	view	reflects	what	could	be	called	an	‘arrogant	attitude’	among	development	organizations,	since	they	assume	that	their	work	can	create	development	in	countries	where	the	local	population	and	the	national	government	have	been	unable	to	do	so.	One	interviewee	argued	that	“there	is	so	much	arrogance	within	these	projects,	it's	unbelievable”	(Practitioner	F	2015:	448).	Pritchett	et	al.	also	contend	that	development	organizations	presuppose	that	“there	is	a	common	
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underlying	structure	characterizing	these	[development]	transformations”	(2010:	4).	Thus,	the	apparent	‘arrogance’	of	development	organizations	seems	to	originate	in	their	belief	that	they	are	familiar	with	the	common	structure	of	development	trajectories	and	therefore	know	how	development	is	done.	
While	it	is	easy	to	condemn	the	apparent	‘arrogance’	of	development	organizations,	especially	when	this	leads	them	to	miscalculate	the	impact	that	their	projects	can	have,	we	might	also	take	into	account	that	a	certain	amount	of	‘arrogance’	or	maybe	rather	“strategic	ignorance”	(Pritchett	2002:	268)	about	the	likelihood	of	development	work	to	be	successful	could	be	necessary	for	development	organizations	to	work.	As	mentioned	before,	development	organizations	need	to	legitimize	their	spending	of	funds	on	specific	projects	by	arguing	convincingly	that	the	project	will	lead	to	a	beneficial	result.	Underlying	such	claims	must	be	a	fundamental	belief	that	development	organizations	can	create	change;	otherwise	the	very	concept	of	development	aid	would	seem	futile.	In	the	end,	it	appears	to	be	a	question	of	balancing	‘arrogance’,	what	development	organizations	might	prefer	to	call	optimism,	and	realism.	
The	perspectives	discussed	in	this	section	make	it	seem	plausible	that	the	development	practices	that	characterized	development	work	in	South	Sudan	are	not	specific	to	this	local	context,	but	rather	exemplify	practices	that	constitute	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices.	This	regime	of	practices	seems	to	correspond	badly	to	the	view	of	development	organizations	as	benevolent	and	altruistic	actors,	and	therefore	it	is	quite	easy	to	be	highly	critical	of	development	work,	as	some	authors	have	also	been	(for	example	Dichter	2003).	Yet,	it	is	more	difficult	to	come	up	with	alternatives,	as	one	must	acknowledge	that	development	organizations	are	part	of	a	political	reality,	in	which	they	have	to	navigate	between	a	variety	of	different	interests	in	order	to	ensure	that	they	are	able	to	continue	to	do	development	work	in	the	future.	
Consequences for global development work Now	that	a	rough	sketch	of	some	of	the	characteristics	of	the	global	development	regime	of	practices	has	been	drawn,	the	next	question	is	which	consequences	this	regime	of	practices	will	have	for	development	work	globally.	One	obvious	option	is	that	development	organizations	are	simply	not	able	to	engage	in	the	type	of	development	activities	that	are	actually	needed	in	developing	countries.	With	so	many	other	considerations	to	be	taken	into	account,	the	question	of	whether	a	project	is	really	needed	can	easily	be	overlooked,	or	following	Bacchi	(2012b)	one	could	argue	that	the	available	solutions	tend	to	define	the	problems	that	will	be	addressed.	In	fact,	as	the	development	rationality	is	not	well	suited	to	foster	a	thorough	understanding	of	the	local	‘reality’	in	developing	countries,	as	was	
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seen	in	Chapter	5,	we	might	even	question	whether	development	organizations	are	capable	of	correctly	assessing	what	is	most	important	in	a	given	context.	When	new	‘buzzwords’	emerge	within	the	development	community,	such	as	‘ownership’,	‘good	governance’	and	‘human	rights’,	they	are	usually	built	on	a	notion	that	a	certain	aspect	of	development	is	vital	for	development	work	to	succeed	(Cornwall	2010).	Over	time,	this	results	in	practitioners	having	“so	many	priorities	stacked	on	top	of	each	other”	(Expert	C	2015:	458),	making	it	all	the	more	difficult	to	determine	what	is	most	important.	
Moreover,	the	fact	that	development	activities	are	structured	around	development	projects	could	mean	that	there	is	not	much	room	for	or	incentive	to	do	‘strategic	thinking’	(Interview,	Sørbø	2016:	285–287).	For	instance,	each	project	is	evaluated	according	to	the	targets	set	out	in	the	Logframe,	and	not	according	to	how	it	contributed	to	meeting	the	goals	of	the	overall	strategy.	In	Chapter	4,	policy	papers	regarding	the	troika’s	strategies	for	engaging	in	South	Sudan	were	analyzed,	and	as	such	these	three	donor	agencies	have	reflected	on	what	their	overall	strategy	for	development	work	in	South	Sudan	should	be.	Thus,	one	would	also	expect	that	the	projects	undertaken	are	ones	that	are	expected	to	contribute	to	this	strategy.	However,	it	appears	that	project	ideas	are	usually	not	assessed	according	to	the	question	of	whether	this	project	is	the	best	one	out	of	several	possible	projects	to	reach	the	goals	of	the	strategy.	This	is	explained	by	one	of	the	interviewees,	who	argued	“Well,	it's	very	seldom	that	we	have	three	or	five	projects	lined	up	and	then	we	have	to	choose	one”	(Interview,	Corneliussen	2016:	281).	In	this	way,	a	strategy	becomes	a	very	loose	frame,	within	which	the	development	organization	can	choose	from	an	array	of	potential	projects	taking	various	considerations	into	account.	
These	issues	certainly	seem	to	be	problematic	for	development	organizations	working	globally,	but	still	they	could	be	dismissed	with	reference	to	the	immensely	difficult	environment	that	development	organizations	work	in.	After	all,	is	it	not	better	to	do	something	than	to	do	nothing?	This	appears	to	be	the	logic	of	many	development	organizations.	As	was	concluded	in	Chapter	5,	the	development	organizations	working	in	South	Sudan	favored	action	over	inaction	because	they	were	under	political	pressure	to	do	something	about	the	‘problems’	in	South	Sudan.	An	interviewee	also	pointed	out	that	development	organizations	generally	have	an	interest	in	keeping	their	projects	running	even	if	they	do	not	yield	any	results,	because	it	is	better	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	something:	“if	you	say,	well	there’s	nothing	we	can	do	here,	so	we	will	shut	down	and	then	get	out	of	here,	that’s	not	an	option	either”	(Expert	E	2015:	152–154).	Yet	this	is	in	direct	contrast	to	the	principle	of	‘do	no	harm’,	which	was	coined	by	Anderson,	who	argued	that	development	aid	risks	fueling	conflict	in	fragile	and	conflict-affected	states	(Anderson	1999).	One	of	the	interviewees	reiterated	this	concern,	stating	“you	can	do	an	incredibly	lot	of	harm	for	one	million”	(Expert	C	2015:	606).	Thus,	it	could	potentially	have	
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devastating	consequences	for	developing	countries	when	development	projects	are	not	properly	designed.	
As	mentioned	above,	some	academic	literature	has	been	highly	critical	of	the	work	of	development	organizations,	yet	in	the	public	debate	development	organizations	have	often	managed	to	render	themselves	beyond	criticism.	According	to	one	interviewee,	in	the	public	debate,	“No	one	says,	by	the	way,	development	aid	is	not	effective”	(Expert	C	2015:	385–386).	This	could	be	due	to	the	development	organizations’	successful	identity	formation	of	themselves	as	inherently	‘good’	and	‘altruistic’	actors.	Critique	of	them	is	therefore	seen	as	unfair,	according	to	a	logic	that	says	‘they	are	doing	their	best	in	a	difficult	environment’,	and	anyone	who	does	voice	criticism	can	be	accused	of	adding	fuel	to	the	flames	in	the	debate	about	cuts	in	aid	budgets.	This	situation	may	become	worse	now	that	the	development	community	is	facing	major	cuts	in	aid	budgets.	As	these	cuts	can	be	seen	as	threats	to	development	organizations’	survival,	it	seems	fair	to	assume	that	they	might	cause	development	organizations	to	become	less	responsive	to	criticisms	of	their	work.	The	lack	of	public	scrutiny	of	how	development	organizations	work	entails	a	limited	incentive	among	development	organizations	to	improve	their	practice.	Instead	development	organizations	seem	to	be	able	to	steer	clear	of	rebukes	by	ensuring	that	most	of	their	projects	are	categorized	as	successful	by	(often	internal)	evaluations	and	representing	failed	projects	as	failed	due	to	the	recipient’s	lack	of	‘ownership’	and/or	‘political	will’.	
Considering	all	of	the	issues	mentioned	in	this	section,	it	seems	reasonable	to	argue	that	the	current	development	regime	of	practices	is	not	creating	the	most	advantageous	conditions	for	development	to	occur	on	a	global	scale.	While	being	cautious	not	to	prescribe	any	blueprint	solutions	to	this	problem,	one	might	argue	that	reaching	a	more	realistic	view	of	development	organizations	as	actors	with	their	own	interests	operating	in	a	political	reality	would	be	a	good	starting	point.	Further,	establishing	a	larger	overlap	between	these	organizations’	‘system	goals’	and	development	goals	could	mean	that	development	practitioners	would	not	have	to	balance	two	different	goals	at	once.	
In conclusion: meeting the new challenge of fragile states So,	what	are	the	consequences	for	the	international	society’s	ability	to	tackle	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states?	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	the	development	community	has	recently	put	much	more	focus	on	fragile	states,	both	with	regards	to	creating	knowledge	about	the	particularities	of	fragile	states	and	channeling	funds	to	development	work	in	fragile	states.	This	shift	can	be	explained	by	the	threat	that	fragile	states	are	seen	to	pose	to	international	peace	and	security	and	by	the	fact	that	a	growing	number	of	the	world’s	poor	people	live	in	fragile	states.	
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International	development	organizations	have	always	worked	in	unfamiliar	contexts,	as	developing	countries	have	often	been	far	from	the	western	countries	where	many	development	organizations	are	based,	both	in	terms	of	geography	and	in	terms	of	the	cultural,	historical	and	political	‘reality’.	The	analysis	in	Chapter	5	showed	how	such	clashes	between	different	‘realities’	can	lead	to	unfavorable	results	in	development	work.	And	when	it	comes	to	fragile	states,	the	local	‘reality’	is	often	even	more	volatile	and	unpredictable	than	in	other	developing	countries,	as	these	countries	are	at	risk	of	succumbing	to	violent	conflict.	This	situation	makes	it	even	more	difficult	for	development	organizations	to	truly	understand	and	keep	up	with	changes	in	the	local	‘reality’	and	adapt	their	projects	accordingly.	As	such,	the	problems	with	a	control-oriented	approach	to	planning,	which	were	mentioned	above,	could	be	exacerbated	when	development	organizations	are	working	in	fragile	states.	But	given	the	amount	of	policy	papers	on	how	to	best	engage	in	fragile	states,	such	as	OECD’s	‘Principles	for	Good	International	Engagement	in	Fragile	States	and	Situations’,	USAID’s	‘Fragile	States	Strategy’	and	DFID’s	‘Why	we	need	to	work	more	effectively	in	fragile	states’,	one	would	expect	that	the	development	organizations	have	adopted	measures	to	meet	this	challenge.	Is	this	not	the	case?	
This	thesis	has	studied	the	practices	of	development	organizations	in	South	Sudan,	which	fits	all	the	common	criteria	of	a	fragile	state	(The	Fund	for	Peace	2015),	and	has	further	focused	on	three	examples	of	development	projects,	which	all	had	a	statebuilding	dimension.	Yet,	it	has	not	found	any	substantial	indications	that	development	organizations	work	in	a	fundamentally	different	way	in	fragile	states	compared	to	other	developing	countries.	Clearly,	a	full	comparative	analysis	has	not	been	conducted,	and	as	such	we	should	be	cautious	in	our	conclusions	here.	Still,	this	observation	is	backed	by	Larson	et	al.,	who	state	that	“The	international	donor	community’s	development	approach	to	South	Sudan	[…]	can	essentially	be	termed	the	status	quo	or	“business	as	usual”	approach”	(Larson	et	al.	2013:	8).	Surely,	development	organizations	may	prioritize	different	kinds	of	projects	in	fragile	states,	but	the	governance	practices	that	characterize	the	development	regime	of	practices	seem	to	be	specific	neither	to	development	work	in	South	Sudan	nor	to	development	work	in	fragile	states.	Accordingly,	it	appears	that	the	emergence	of	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	not	led	development	organizations	to	change	the	way	they	do	development	work.	
In	addition	to	this,	the	analysis	in	Chapter	4	showed	that	the	troika	countries	did	not	even	use	the	term	‘fragile	state’	in	their	policy	papers	regarding	South	Sudan.	This	finding	was	quite	surprising,	and	when	combined	with	the	assertion	that	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	not	fundamentally	changed	the	way	development	is	done,	it	opens	up	for	a	discussion	of	which	impact,	if	any,	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	had	on	the	development	community.	A	negative	perspective	on	this	may	contend	that	the	large	amount	of	academic	literature	and	other	types	of	knowledge	on	fragile	states	has	been	wasted	if	
	 67	
development	organizations	have	not	allowed	it	to	influence	their	practices.	On	the	other	hand,	a	positive	consequence	might	be	that	criticisms	of	the	concept	of	‘fragile	states’,	such	as	that	it	conflates	states	that	are	very	different	and	that	it	lacks	any	analytical	value,	should	not	be	a	great	cause	for	concern	(Grimm	et	al.	2014:	202).	Certainly,	these	findings	could	lead	one	to	wonder	whether	the	potentially	self-reinforcing	nature	of	the	fragile	states	agenda	has	led	us	to	greatly	overestimate	the	importance	and	novelty	of	the	category	of	‘fragile	states’,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	development	work.	
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7. Conclusion 
This	thesis	set	out	to	answer	the	following	overall	research	question:	How	is	South	Sudan	problematized	as	a	development	task	by	key	members	of	the	international	society	and	how	have	international	development	organizations	approached	this	development	task?	The	two	parts	of	the	analysis	and	the	discussion	have	examined	different	aspects	of	this	question,	and	thus	when	combining	the	findings	from	these	chapters	some	overall	conclusions	can	be	reached.	
Through	an	analysis	of	the	way	development	organizations	have	worked	in	South	Sudan,	this	thesis	has	demonstrated	how	development	organizations	are	part	of	a	political	reality,	which	means	that	they	have	to	gather	support	for	their	choices	and	legitimize	their	actions	towards	other	actors	in	the	field.	These	actors	can	both	be	donor	and	recipient	governments	as	well	as	the	population	who	has	contributed	to	development	projects	through	their	tax	payments.	This	was	illustrated	in	Chapter	4,	which	concluded	that	the	UK,	the	U.S.	and	Norway	have	all	problematized	South	Sudan	as	a	case	of	‘underdevelopment’,	rather	than	as	a	fragile	state.	In	their	policy	papers,	especially	the	UK	and	the	U.S.	phrased	their	priorities	in	development	language	in	order	to	make	sure	that	their	priorities	were	viewed	as	non-controversial	and	thus	could	gather	widespread	support.	Also	in	Chapter	5	it	was	evident	that	development	organizations	had	to	employ	a	calculative	rationality	in	order	to	legitimize	their	spending	on	development	projects.	Further,	the	development	organizations’	prioritization	of	‘system	goals’	over	development	goals	also	reflects	their	need	to	establish	their	own	competence	in	doing	development	work,	and	thereby	legitimize	the	continued	allocation	of	large	amounts	of	money	to	development	work.	
However,	the	governance	practices	that	development	organizations	engaged	in,	in	order	to	navigate	this	political	reality	made	it	difficult	for	them	to	use	their	understanding	of	the	local	‘reality’	in	a	productive	way	and	foresee	how	it	would	impact	their	development	projects.	In	Chapter	4	it	was	argued	that	the	problem	representations	in	the	policy	papers	were	out	of	touch	with	the	local	‘reality’,	because	local	phenomena	were	categorized	in	development	terms	that	did	not	allow	for	the	complexity	of	these	phenomena	to	be	included.	This	issue	appeared	again	in	Chapter	5,	where	the	development	rationality	and	the	translation	of	knowledge	into	linear	development	narratives	in	project	designs	caused	development	organizations	to	overlook	important	aspects	of	the	local	‘reality’.	As	such,	there	was	a	clash	between	the	‘reality’	development	organizations	operated	in	and	the	‘reality’	that	people	on	the	ground	in	South	Sudan	experienced.	
This	clash	meant	that	development	organizations	were	not	particularly	effective	in	promoting	developmental	change	in	South	Sudan.	In	fact,	the	way	they	approached	development	work,	or	in	other	
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words	the	characteristics	of	the	regime	of	practices,	was	not	advantageous	for	reaching	the	goal	of	development.	Rather,	it	seemed	to	be	more	effective	in	securing	the	institutional	survival	of	the	development	organizations	themselves.	Furthermore,	the	GOSS	also	engaged	in	governance	practices	that	limited	development	organizations’	space	for	action,	and	further	impeded	their	ability	to	promote	development.	The	discussion	in	Chapter	6	suggested	that	these	issues	might	not	be	specific	to	development	work	in	South	Sudan,	but	rather	form	part	of	a	global	development	regime	of	practices.	Moreover,	it	appears	that	development	practices	have	not	been	changed	significantly	to	meet	the	new	challenge	of	fragile	states.	If	this	is	in	fact	the	case,	then	the	negative	consequences	of	the	regime	of	practices	could	be	potentially	harmful	for	the	international	society’s	ability	to	contribute	to	global	development,	and	perhaps	also	international	peace	and	security,	in	the	future,	for	example	in	relation	to	implementing	the	new	Sustainable	Development	Goals.	
Given	the	conclusions	reached,	the	combined	governmentality/ethnography	of	development	analytical	framework	that	I	have	used	in	this	investigation	seems	to	have	been	rewarding	for	the	study	of	the	practices	of	development	organizations.	Still,	the	analytical	strategy	would	probably	have	benefitted	from	a	methodological	approach	that	could	have	brought	us	closer	to	the	everyday	practices	of	development	practitioners.	For	example,	conducting	fieldwork	within	a	development	organization	might	have	enabled	the	study	to	more	precisely	characterize	the	practices	of	one	specific	organization.	It	may	only	be	through	a	combination	of	several	such	studies	that	one	would	be	able	to	fully	account	for	the	characteristics	of	the	global	development	regime	of	practices.	
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